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Abstract
Observers have frequently commented on the high degree 
of sexual differentiation that prevails in Islamic societies; 
particularly, they have been at pains to point out how this 
differentiation amounts to discrimination against women as a 
category. Generally, the argument runs, women have no legal 
or political rights, they remain the legal and economic dependents 
of men, cannot accede to any political office, participate to a 
very limited extent in any form of public life, and have no role 
in the processes of decision-making.
It is essential, however, to take account of how women 
are differentiated among themselves, within the female sex category, 
and to assess whether this differentiation alters their social 
position in any way. Women are differentiated according to their 
relative rank, status, and prestige, and also by their relative 
power and ability to influence policy. The most noticeable 
differentiation, which applies in all social situations, is between 
the women of different age and marital statuses. The matrons, 
with children of marriageable age, have established domestic 
positions, and are frequently consulted about important decisions 
that are taken. They cannot, therefore, be equated with the 
young, unmarried girls, who have no right of choice in their 
first marriage, and who are subject to the authority not only 
of men, but also of older women.
In comparing the roles of women in different social 
situations, it is useful to analyse in terms of the relative 
chances for power of the matrons. It then becomes clear that, 
where women are members of households that are part of corporate 
groupings, they can, by the time of their matronhood, achieve 
positibns of public significance and of great influence in the 
decisions that men take. Clearly, men must take account of the 
opinions of women in such a situation*
Introduction
The following thesis takes the form of what might best 
be called a "situational career analysis" of women*s chances for 
power in two Sudanese nomadic tribes. It is "situational" in that 
it takes full account of the disadvantages that women suffer when 
compared as a category with men. But, rather than remaining with 
such categorical statements, I approach the question in terms of 
the changes in status that women undergo in the course of the 
only career that is open to them . . . marriage and maternity.
In order to assess the significance of such changes in status,
I focus on the two extremes of women*s careers, their status as 
unmarried girls, subject to the effective authority not only of 
men, but also of older women, and their status as matrons, the 
mothers of children of marriageable age* By focussing on these 
two extremes, it is possible to speak also of the way in which 
women*s chances for power develop in the course of a successful 
marital and maternal career. For although women cannot fulfill 
any formal leadership role, or attain political office, they 
can emerge to positions which give them considerable influence 
in the processes of decision-making, both domestic and public.
The contrast is clear between the young girl who has no role 
to play in decisions that are taken about her own future, 
including her own marriage, and the matron, who has a position 
of considerable influence over domestic decisions that relate 
to the interests of both herself and her children and may even 
have a role in camp and tribal politics.
The ideas contained in my thesis developed in the 
course of an attempt to explain two seemingly anomalous 
occurrences, I discovered in the description that
Gunnison gives of political life amongst the Humr Baggara, 
an Islamic cattle pastoral society in Northern Sudan, that 
women had on one occasion been able to combine and force 
the men of a camp to action, and that at the time of a 
marriage, it was the mother of the bride who conducted 
negotiation about bridewealth, and who had the last word 
about whom the girl should marry (Gunnison!1966:117 and 95)* 
These occurrences implied that women as a category had some 
influence over not only the private and domestic decisions 
of men, but also camp politics; and that within the female 
sex category, certain women had a greater role to play than 
others. These implications needed explaining, for I had been 
led to believe by the descriptions of other Islamic pastoral 
societies that women were subject always to the authority of 
men, who were their guardians and providers; and that women 
had no part to play in decisions relating to their own future. 
This impression had in fact been confirmed by what I had read 
in a monograph relating to a neighbouring people, the Kababish 
Arabs, where women have no role in public affairs, and within 
the domestic sphere remain subject always to the authority 
of the male head, usually father or husband. Most indicative 
of this subordination was the fact that at the time of a girl’s
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marriage, the mother had a right to be consulted, but the 
decision lay not -with her but with the father (Asad:1970:57)•
These two societies, the Humr Baggara, and the Kababish 
Arabs, share certain features which permit useful comparison, 
and help to explain the expectations that I had concerning the 
role of women in politics. They are both Islamic societies 
subject to Sunni Muslim law in which the legal differentiation 
of men from women focusses on two major criteria. Women are 
considered to be perpetual legal minors, and in property 
allocation, the legal share of a woman is half that of a man's.
A woman therefore must have an adult male to act as her 
guardian and representative of her interests, and is presumed 
not to be economically independent, for as a wife or daughter 
she can inherit only half the share of a man. Moreover, as 
both Cunnison and Asad stress, such legal'shares as women are 
entitled to are normally ignored, and customary allocation 
of animals works even more against women than if they were 
granted their legal rights (Cunnison:Appendix 2> Asad:7l).
They are both nomadic pastoral societies, where women form 
part of households which are based on the tents that are their 
own property. These tents may form part of stable and enduring 
camping units, which move together throughout the seasonal 
migration, sometimes separating from, sometimes combining with 
other camping units (see the Humr) or join with other tents on 
a more haphazard basis with no enduring units (see the commoner 
Kababish). The division of labour is on the grounds of age and
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sex, so that the women are confined, to that range of tasks 
most compatible with their remaining in the camps, while the 
men utilise the mobility of the animals not only to move 
between the different areas throughout the year, but also to 
move in a range of pasture outside the camps. This may mean 
that some of the men are absent for long intervals (Asad:19) 
or only that the herds are away from the camp during the day 
(Cunnison:66). But the stereotype of women as a category to 
be compared with men, is that they are private, domestic 
creatures, whose range of tasks and primary roles, duties 
and obligations focusses on the tent, TJhereas men, by the 
nature of their work and political responsibility are 
economically dominant and fully involved in the public life 
of herding tasks and camp politics*
How then could I explain the manifest public 
significance of the Humr women as a category and the status 
differentiation amongst women? It would be impossible to 
account for this if I were to follow the approach that most 
observers take up in relation to the position of women in 
society. For generally observers have been content to point 
out the sexual differentiation operating in all societies to 
separate women as a category from men. Women have been 
equated with serfs and slaves!
"The social division of labour involves women less 
deeply than their menfolk in the central institutions
...cont.
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political, legal, administrative etc, of their 
society. They are indeed subject to control.
But the range of controls they experience is 
simpler, less varied. Mediated through fewer 
human contacts, their social responsibilities 
are more confined to the domestic range. The 
decisions they take do not have repercussions on 
a very wide range of institutions. The web of 
their social life, though it may tie them down 
effectively enough, is of a looser texture.
Their social relations certainly carry less 
weighty pressure than those which are also 
institutional in range. This is the social 
condition they share with slaves and serfs,11 
(Douglas :1970:84)
And in the specific context of middle-eastern society, this 
impression is reinforced and reiterated:
”Generally exploited in spite of laws, sold sometimes, 
often beaten, constrained to forced labour, assassinated 
almost with impunity, the Mediterranean woman is one of 
the serfs of the contemporary world,”
(Tillion:1966:cited in Gordon:1968:9)
— via-*
Rather more moderate, but equally non-purposive in his comments 
is Gabriel Baer:
“Characteristic of Arab society in the Middle East 
is the different status of men and women. Unlike 
in many other societies, and particularly ih modern 
western society, women are in a greatly inferior 
position both materially and spiritually, and 
discrimination is apparent in all spheres of life, 
fhe birth of a son is cause for celebration* not 
so that of a daughter. A mother of a daughter 
only is condemned to a divorce that is sanctioned 
by society. Even in childhood, boys have a 
preferential status. Complete propriety is 
expected of a married woman, but not of her 
husband . . . .  ?/idespread is the custom of 
confining the Arab woman to prevent her from 
coming into contact with men who are not members 
of her family . . . .  segregation of women has 
assumed great importance. Women are not allowed 
to share any communal activity, or to assume any 
public position, and they never appear in men's 
company".
(Baer:1964;34 and 42)
My dissatisfaction with the usual approach to the question of 
women's position in society lies not so much in questioning
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the facts as stated above, nor in ignoring the fact that 
anthropologists such as Gunnison and Asad, as well as others, 
have pointed out how customary allocation of resources 
operates even more against women. It lies in the tacit 
agreement to leave the question at that stage, with such 
statements, and with no explanation as to how women's status 
and their power potential varies between different societies, 
and within societies according to different factors. Baer, 
for example, goes on to point out that Bedouin women are 
different in that "the desert way of life does not permit 
of separation from men in the manner practised in settled 
communities" (idem). But he does nothing to explain why 
this should be so, or. to explain the effects that it has 
on women's position, or on their ability to operate inde­
pendently. A more interesting statement comes from Tillion;
"The degradation of the woman is not . . . .  the 
result of endogamy, but of the incomplete evolution 
of an endogamous society . . . .  The greatest 
alienation for the women is seen in populations 
that are changing . . . .  that is to say, are 
detribalised by becoming sedentary and urbanised."
(cited Gordon:196BiB)
So far it is clear from these observers only that 
there is some difference between the status of women in
- i n ­
different societies, and that this must be related to economic 
and political factors. This is so large-scale and grandiose 
that it is not conducive to purposive analysis., Moreover, it 
is misleading, by focussing on a concept which has no basis in 
social fact. There is no such thing as the status of women in 
society. The statuses of women vary according to age, marital 
and maternal position. This has been made clear by E.L. Peters 
both in statement and in the way in which he approaches the 
subject of "sexual differentiation". In his article, as yet 
unpublished, he analyses "Sexual Differentiation in Two Arab 
Communities" in terms of the life cycle of both men and women:
"The status of males and females, whatever other 
statuses may be available for capture, will 
inevitably vary with age. There is no such thing 
as the status of women ~ or of men for that matter - 
and to lose sight of this elementary fact leads to 
serious analytical distortion".
(Peters:S.D.:8)
Unless this is clearly understood, then we, as 
anthropologists, are beguiled into moving from general statement, 
to over-generalisation and creation of false categories.
The general statement is most clearly given by Mary Douglas:
"(Women1s) place in the public structure of roles 
is clearly defined in relation to one or two
...cont.
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points of reference, say in relation to 
husbands and fathers. As for the rest of 
their social life, it takes place at the 
relatively unstructured, interpersonal level, 
with other women in the case of women, with 
other slaves and serfs in the case of slaves 
and serfs. Of course I would be wrong to say 
that the network of relations that a woman has 
with others of her sex is unstructured. A 
delicate patterning certainly prevails. But 
its significance for society at large is less 
than the- significance of men’s relations with 
one another in the public role system. A 
quarrel between women has not anything like 
the same repercussions as a quarrel between 
their husbands. If they want to give their 
social relations with one another a more 
central structuring, they can only do so by 
embroiling their menfolk, . . . ”
(Douglas:op. cit,:B4)
But this is then taken to be not merely a division into 
sex categories in the role structure of a society, but also 
a qualitative division into two cultures:
’’Here (among the Somali) as in other societies 
where sexual differentiation is equally strongly
,..cont.
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engrained, there are in effect two cultures - 
the dominant world of men, and the subordinate 
sphere of women.”
(Lewis :1971s77)
This further implies that women are not only subordinate but 
vulnerable, and because of this vulnerability turn to ritual 
which ’’celebrates the experience” or allows them to ”air their 
grievances” whenever their social situation is unsatisfactory. 
This, in the case of the Somali women, seems to apply to most 
married women: they as a category are members of the possession 
cults that are predominantly female:
’’(the) characteristically female affliction (of sar) 
operates among the Somali as a limited deterrent 
against the abuses of neglect and injury in a 
conjugal relationship which is heavily biassed 
in favour of men. Where they are given little 
domestic security and are otherwise ill-protected 
from the pressures and excations of men, women 
may thus resort to spirit possession as a means 
of airing their grievances obliquely, and of 
gaining some satisfaction”.
(Lewis :1971s77)
This is a far more general statement than that which Mary 
Douglas will allow:
"If there is something unsatisfactory about the 
relation which pins them into the central structure 
(such as widowhood or an unresponsive husband)
(women) are very susceptible to religious movements 
which celebrate the experience at a low level of 
organisation."
(Douglas :ibiri)
I take the statement of Lewis, cited above, as being the summary 
of the main line of argument in his survey of "Ecstatic 
Religion", and the culmination of the way in which the study 
of women’s position in society has been moving so far, I am 
compelled to take issue with the main trends of his argument 
which relate to married women: not only because I consider that 
aspects of it are faulty in themselves, but also because as an 
anthropologist who has worked in a Muslim nomadic society, 
his words carry authority in an area of study in which I 
am myself interested. If his argument could hold, then it 
would imply that we had a means by which we could identify 
the most vulnerable and frustrating of social positions in 
a given society. He would argue that there is a dual aspect 
to description of participants in possession cults. It is 
not a question only of the individual participants seeking
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relief from frustration, or finding some kind of bargaining 
counter, for all possession cults have among their partici­
pants disproportionate numbers of certain categories of 
social positions. This must be explained by the particular 
tensions and frustrations built into those social positions. 
Among the categories that he identified for the Somali 
possession cults, that of married women dominated, and this 
became the basis for the statement that he made above.
However, this argument falls down at several points. 
The most important of these points is the assumption of a sex 
category in possession cults, despite his own evidence that 
women as a category are differentiated among themselves, and 
that men also participate in the cults. Lewis is led by his 
assumption of a direct relation between high degree of sexual 
differentiation and powerlessness of women to over-general 
statements, and to the creation of false categories. He 
overlooks in his argument that it is not all women in a 
male-dominated society who participate in the cults. It is 
only some. Therefore it is necessary for his argument to 
identify those women who do participate, and the structural 
situations that have produced the tensions which are either 
"celebrated" or "alleviated" in the possession cults (see 
Wilson’s article for some very cogent reasoning that this 
is essential:1967)•
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The general hypothesis that Lewis puts forward runs 
as follows: in societies where there is marked sexual 
differentiation, a development of two cultures occurs, the 
dominant culture of the men who monopolise the social 
structure, and the subordinate culture of the women* The 
women are not merely subordinate, they are also peripheral 
and deprived, because of their lack of resources, and 
consequently frustrated. This frustration comes to be 
expressed in peripheral possession cults, for no other 
formally sanctioned means of expression exists. The evidence 
for this thesis lies in the grand survey that Lewis made in 
different societies, which reiterates his contention that:
"a widespread form of possession, which is 
initially regarded as an illness, is in many 
cases virtually restricted to women . . . .
(And) for all their concern with disease and 
its treatment, such women’s possession cults 
are also, I argue, thinly disguised protest 
movements directed against the dominant sex.
They thus play a significant part in the sex- 
war in traditional societies and cultures where 
women lack more obvious and direct means for 
forwarding their aims. To a considerable extent 
they protect women from the exactions of men, and 
offer an effective vehicle for manipulating 
husbands and male relatives11,
(Lewis:1971:30 and 31)
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This hypothesis is inadequate either as a general 
statement concerning the effects of marked sexual differentiation 
on women’s ability to operate in their own interests, or in 
explaining who. participates in possession cults and why. It 
anticipates a division between the interests of men and of 
women, and assumes that there are occasions where these 
interests will clash. It ignores the positive aspect of 
women’s position in marriage, which is to grant them resources 
by which they can "manipulate husbands and female relatives".
And it overlooks the fact that a thesis such as he presents 
must explain not only the presence of certain categories of 
people, but also the absence of others.
When speaking of women in "male-dominated" societies, 
it is not possible to refer to a single status for women, nor 
to summarise it in terms of jural and political discrimination. 
Women, by virtue of their legal and economic dependence on men 
have rights in respect of which they can make claims on the 
men. Their status is not immutable and unchanging in relation 
to men, but develops and alters in the course of a marital and 
maternal career. The power of women will vary according to 
their structural position in marriage, for the demands that 
women make and which they hope will be met "are always in 
respect of specific relationships" (Werbner:1972:235)»
This point was made by Werbner when he was himself 
involved in analysing "ritualised modes of fixing moral
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responsibility for illness” among the Kalanga of eastern 
Botswana, for as he clearly demonstrated, the power of the 
women as hosts in these rituals was not the power of the weak:
11 a host mediates and makes her demands as a 
relative - a kinswoman or an affine - and she 
may make these demands, during spirit possession, 
only in a residential content clearly defined 
according to kinship. No principal in the 
rituals of possession makes demands indiscriminately 
against a category, such as males or females; 
demands are always made in respect of specific 
relationshipsl(.
(op. cit.:235)
Therefore one would be mistaken to analyse the participation of 
anyone within these rituals without assessing their structural 
position in terms of the specific relationships involved in the 
action. Moreover, it is misleading to assume that all women 
necessarily are of lesser structural importance than men:
"A woman’s structural importance cannot be summed up 
by her jural status as a legal dependent of a man, 
or by the determination of her residence by her 
husband’s. Being a legal dependent of a man entitles 
a woman to rights. These, like a woman’s interests 
vary from one society to another, and within a
,. .cont.
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single society, vary from one status or phase in 
her life to the next. She need not be barred, 
because she is the legal dependent of one man, 
from having a cluster of rights and interests in 
sets of other men and their goods. Indeed, her 
structural importance may be great precisely because 
it is only through her that such a cluster may be 
combined with the different rights and interests 
of a legal ward.”
(op, cit,i237)
My thesis is concerned to demonstrate exactly this 
point: that all women who are married have some structural 
importance by virtue of the rights they have as the dependents 
both of husband and agnatic kin. In addition they gain 
importance with the strategic interests that are involved in 
their marriage. Such strategic importance of marriage varies 
as between societies and within a single society, and this 
in turn affects the possibilities that individual married 
women have for protecting their interests and welfare. Those 
women whose marriages are of great strategic importance are 
mediating economic and political links between men and groups 
(Peters:S.D.: and my Chapter One) and they have the possibility 
of manipulating such links? whereas those women whose marriages 
are of limited strategic importance lose this resource (see 
the commoner Kababish women).
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Werbner’s statement is well backed up by Lev/is1 
own material on the Somali as presented in different sources. 
This is best demonstrated by the emphasis that he places on 
the strategic links involved in marriage and the prevalence 
among marriages of those arranged to link lineages. In his 
pamphlet of 1962, Lewis makes explicit mention at several 
points of how ”the nature of marriage11, the rights and duties 
established by matrimony between individual and lineages, has 
to be viewed in relation not only to the exclusiveness of 
agnation, but also in relation to the importance which affinal 
and matrilateral ties often assume in linking lineages” (7). 
Marriage between lineages, which predominates over all other 
kinds of link through marriage (25) ”does have economic 
importance and at least some political implications” (23) 
for where agnatic ties are weak or non-existent,*marriage is 
regarded positively as a means of establishing useful 
connection between groups”, (25)
Where marriages serve the interests of men in such 
a manner and where links established between men via a woman 
are of such importance as he makes out, then the women involved 
have resources of which they can make use in protecting 
themselves and their interests. They will not be isolated
within the marriage and subject to the authority of one man 
only, they retain the interests of their agnatic kin, are 
therefore mediators, and possible manipulators. The general
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trend is in fact for the agnatic kin of a woman to retain 
legal responsibility for her, which gradually loosens in 
effectiveness as the woman becomes incorporated "morally” 
into her husband's group, as she bears him sons. This 
implies a gradual loosening of the ties that she has retained 
with her natal kin and suggests that she can never be totally 
subordinated to her husband, for other men have interests in 
her and her welfare. A woman is never cut off finally from 
her natal kin, and a woman's brother and other close male 
agnates are very much concerned not merely with the maintenance 
of the marriage but also with her well-being. "Indeed the 
anxiety that the pastoralists display in maintaining effective 
relations with their affines is to be understood not only in 
relation to economic and political considerations but also to 
the continuing moral interests of a married woman's kin in 
her welfare and security” (33). I can find no evidence that 
Somali women are left alone to the extreme exactions of their 
husbands, without other men also being involved.
This would seam clear enough and amounts in itself 
to serious criticism of Lewis? argument. But it is even more 
telling to find at least one instance of a woman being able 
to force through a divorce against the wishes of her husband, 
and against the economic interests of her agnatic kin. Here 
a young woman, married as a second wife to a man who had 
retained one wife and divorced another, was complaining bitterly
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of the treatment meted out to her by her senior co-wife.
She wished not merely to alter the treatment of her senior, 
but to end the marriage. Neither the husband, nor the brothers 
were willing to end the marriage, and the woman ran away 
several' times only to be returned to her husband by her brothers. 
Eventually the woman's persistence was such that the divorce 
was arranged, despite the reluctance of her brothers, who 
were forced to part with some camels, and also a much prized 
rifle (36-7). It was clearly unjust that the woman should ever 
have been put in this position, and to that extent it was clear 
that she was subordinate to the men involved. However, she 
was not helpless, she was eventually able to force the hand of 
the men and get a divorce.
If I were to attempt to account for this in Lewis' 
terms, there would be some very real problems raised. For, 
at 110 point does he mention this woman turning to possession 
as a means of exacting what she wanted. And I would not have 
expected her to, for she turned to the kind of action that 
would be most successful . . in this case running away from 
her husband and to her brothers, until they could no longer 
resist the claims she was making on them. She had the right 
to insist on their supporting her moral welfare, and 
ultimately it was an appeal that they could not resist.
Somali women have a great advantage in their marriages, 
which does not apply for example to most Kababish women.
—XXII -
They retain the active interests of their agnatic kin. As 
they pass through successful marital and maternal careers, the 
respect and prestige accorded to them increases, along with 
the security of their personal position. Or so it would, Were 
it not for the threat of polygyny and of the husband taking 
a second wife. This is a very real threat for the Somali 
women, as Lewis* figures indicate, for of a total of 77 men, 
44.2$ had one wife, and the rest had two or more (1962:8). 
Whereas for either the Humr women or the ICababish women, this 
is not so (Cunnison:!:94; Asad:41). The threat lies in the 
public challenge that the new wife offers to both the status 
and prestige of the older wife. For one thing, the older 
wife is intensely vulnerable at this stage, for she has a 
great deal of her interests invested in the marriage, through 
the children she may have and the way in which she has 
become absorbed into the kin of her husband and children.
The options open to the older wife are few, and women placed 
in such a position will resist strongly.
Unlike the new wife referred to in the case above, 
the older woman has little opportunity to turn to agnatic kin, 
or simply to remove from her husband*s camp. She was "trapped" 
in her marriage, and, although we are not told this, I would 
suggest that she would be the woman who would resort to 
spirit possession in this situation. In this suggestion I
am borne out by Wilson, who in a note to his article makes 
the following comparison:
"Comparison of the Somali with another society 
cited by lewis, the Hausa, raises the questions 
of the relationship between ranking of 
polygynously married wives and the status of 
the 'seized' wife. Among the Somali it is the 
established wife who succumbs to possession, 
but among the Hausa it is the new wife . . . .  
the status of a Hausa senior wife is not 
threatened by the advent of the new wife - 
in fact it is enhanced. The new wife is placed 
in an inferior position, and it is she who 
succumbs to possession. Among the Somali it 
is the established wife's position which is 
threatened, and consequently it is she who is 
likely to be seized by spirits". (Wilson:1967*377)
It is reasonable to assume that it is the older 
married women who are in the greatest danger of having a new 
wife brought into their marriage. It is also reasonable to 
assume that the new wife will be quite a bit younger, and 
still closely attached to agnatic kin, and frequently wishing 
to have a divorce rather than be part of a polygynous house­
hold. This puts her in a radically different situation from
the established wife, whose interests lie in maintaining the 
marriage, but altering the conditions of that marriage if 
possible, i.e. by getting rid of the new wife, or where that 
is impossible, gaining some kind of compensation from her 
husband. The real battle therefore is between the women, 
not between the women and the husband.
"The threat is not her husband, it is the new wife, 
not a male, but a female. The husband is the 
agent who is instrumental in bringing about the 
situation of tension, and he remains the focus 
of the conflict between the two women".
(laiaonsop. cit.:370)
Moreover, the battle is unequalj for whereas one wishes to 
change only the conditions of her marriage, the other wishes 
to end the marriage altogether.
Lewis' error has been to point out different features 
of the Somali's women's position within their marriage, without 
relating them together. It is for example difficult to account 
for the effect of the "frequent" divorces that take place 
without knowing more of when they occur. First of all, I am 
not sure how he measures a "high" rate of divorce, for by 
comparison with the Humr, the rate he gives of 26 divorces out 
of a total of 135, i.e. 19.3$, is low. Within the Humr, out of 
a total of 139 marriages considered, 76 were ended in divorce,
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i.e. 55$ (Cunnisontl!90). And if it were possible to break 
down farther the figures so as to know at what stage in a 
marriage divorce occurred, then some useful analysis could 
follow.
It would be important to know, for example whether 
the attempts of men to introduce a new wife into a household 
would be reflected in a rising proportion of divorces. A 
second point is that the occurrence of divorce is not in itself 
necessarily a factor of insecurity among woman. For, as the 
example of the Humr women shows, the largest proportion of 
divorces occur among first marriages, of which the greatest 
number are in-surra marriages. After this first marriage 
girls are free to choose their second partners, and the 
arrangements made about provision are such that they are 
not left destitute.
The situation with which Humr women, with very few 
exceptions do not have to cope, however, is of being in a 
polygynous household. It is this factor that is crucial to 
the Somali women's security and power. Whereas a Humr
woman who has successfully established herself as a matron 
in a household has a strong and proud position which gives 
her a voice in public affairs, a Somali matron is threatened 
by the possibility of a new wife being brought in, challenging 
her status, diverting her husband and ultimately usurping 
her position. These are the women whom one would expect to
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find most represented in the spirit possession cults. For 
these are the women whose social position is most vulnerable 
and who are the least able to find the support necessary to 
change their situation.
The method by which I was able to identify which 
category of married women among the Somali would predominate 
in the possession cults demonstrated thy initial contentions 
about how one can usefully analyse the question of women's 
roles in society. It proved necessary to adopt a form of 
"situational career analysis", demonstrating that the progress 
of a Somali married woman to the position of highest status 
and prestige, that of matron, was threatened by a factor 
beyond her control, i.e. polygyny. It also made clear that 
whereas Lewis held that divorce was the important factor of 
instability among married women, the rate of divorce was not 
nearly so high as among the Humr, and could not be assumed 
to be a major cause of insecurity. Rather than divorce, it 
was polygyny which was the major threat to Somali women's 
chances for power. Despite the corporate interests held 
in women, and the gradual incorporation of the long-married 
wife into the group of her husband and his children, one 
could not predict that the matrons were the women with 
positions of greatest power and prestige amongst the Somali 
women*
The plan of the chapters in my thesis indicates 
the lines along which I have charted the path of the careers 
of the Humr and Kababish women, and clarifies the reasons
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why I consider the status of matron to differ radically between 
the two societies. In Chapter One I explore how a woman moves 
from the status of unmarried girl to that of matron through 
a successful marital and maternal career, and the changes that 
occur in the course of this career.
Primarily these changes can be related to the fact 
that, once a woman is married, she has a sphere of domestic 
influence by virtue of the claims that she can make on her 
husband, and because she is the focus of links between men 
mediated through her marriage, Where these links between 
men are operative, and serve their strategic interests, then 
she has the possibility of not only mediating links but also 
of manipulating them in her own interests by virtue of the 
claims that she has on the different men. The corporate 
interests that the Humr men retain in women as female agnates 
allows the married women this role of mediator/manipulator, 
and allows for complexity in the set of claims that a Humr 
matron has over men. Most Kababish women lack this role, 
and consequently do not extend the range of their influence 
beyond the domestic sphere where they are each subject to the 
authority of one man, the head of the household, normally the 
husband.
When women and their children remain the focus of 
interests of agnatic corporations, then those women who have 
complex marital careers can build up material resources from
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the provision that is made for them and their children. Whan, 
in addition married women have the chance of making a profit 
from the housekeeping provision made to them, it is possible 
that some women might accumulate sufficient material resources 
in the later stages of their marital careers to have freed 
themselves from the authority of any one man, and have some 
choice about where to live. This accumulation is illustrated 
in Chapter Two by the Humr women, and by the Humr matron, who 
by a combination of all these factors was able to establish 
herself in an independent household, and with her economic 
resources to subsidise an important political event. Such a 
possibility is beyond the reach of any Kababish woman.
Chapter Three explores the implications of women 
not being able to survive without the assistance of other 
women at times of crisis, and suggests that some greater 
solidarity might emerge amongst women who could be mobilised 
to confront the men. This is proved to be unfounded, for the 
only occasions where women do combine in action are in units 
either larger or smaller than the range over which the support 
network of an individual woman extends, and it cannot be shown 
that the support network of a woman develops into any form 
of action-set for political purposes. The conclusion is that 
whereas the structural importance of Humr women in marriage 
is such that it allows for some matrons to emerge to positions
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of prominence and independence, the same is not true of the 
Kababish matrons. They lack the basic resource of corporate 
interests being held by natal kin in a woman after her marriage, 
and consequently remain subject always to the economic 
dominance and effective authority of one man*
Chapter One 
Section Ai The Meaning of Marriage
A marriage taking place causes new relationships to be 
created and realignments in previously existing relationships, and 
these changes and realignments-focus on the central nexus of familial 
relations of father and son, and mother and daughter. *The 
marriage of a son indicates his economic independence of his father, 
and grants him the status of household head separate from the domestic 
authority of his father. And the marriage of a daughter is the 
occasion on which the matron, the mother of children of marriageable 
age, will seek to exercise her power to influence the course of 
events. The marriage of a daughter is a critical time for her, and 
where she can effectively influence the course of negotiations, or 
delay the time of marriage, then this is indicative of great changes 
having taken place since the time when she was herself married* It 
implies that a matron has been able to accumulate resources which 
give her an effective role in decision-making, a role which was 
certainly denied to her prior to her own first marriage* So the 
moment of a marriage is a suitable index of how changes in familial 
relations come about.
Marriage establishes a new household, and in so doing 
involves a realignment of familial relationships, -for the bride and 
groom in establishing a new domestic domain in the tent of the bride 
are removing from their natal households. In the realignment of
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relationships that this involves, the crucial nexus is that of 
the groom and his father, and the daughter and her mother,
“fhe groom in order to marry must be able to furnish sufficient 
animals to maintain the new household, and the provider of such 
animals is his father. And the bride is now mistress of her own 
domestic domain and no longer subject to the effective authority of 
her mother. The bride can now make claims in her own right, and is 
for the first time at the centre of a realignment of those rights, 
duties and responsibilities that are held with respect to her by men.
The marriage of a son involves necessarily a realignment 
in the relations of a father with his son, for the time of his 
marriage is a statement of his actual or potential independence of 
his father, and involves his removal from the domestic authority of 
the father. But whether this realignment amounts to a crisis or not 
is dependent on several factors. The most important of these are how 
provision is ensured for the son's household, and in what manner the 
father has become dependent on the son. During the course of the 
son's maturing, there may well have been a subtle' shift in familial 
relations, whereby the continued viability of the household rests on 
the son and his labour contribution. In the two societies to which 
X refer, the clearest index of whether a marriage creates a crisis 
in father-son relations seems to be whether a father can delay a 
marriage taking place.
It is possible for either the marriage of a young man or 
the establishment of the new household to be delayed, for the two 
events are not necessarily simultaneous. But any delay that arises
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seems not to be so much related to the economic status of the 
potential groom, as to the manner in -which he receives the animals 
that are necessary for him to marry and maintain a household. The 
Humr do not delay marriage for economic reasons $ but both marriage 
and the establishment of a new household can be delayed for the 
Kababish groom. The necessary animals may still be in the control 
of the father who uses this fact to try and influence his son’s 
decisions.
In neither society is inheritance of animals of major 
importance in familial relations. ’Most men who manage to attain 
old age have almost invariably disposed of all their property to 
their sons byybhe time the youngest is married and set up” (Asad:70). 
And with the Humr, the distribution of animals left after a death 
is decided by a family council, and any common pattern that emerged in 
the few instances that Cunnison recorded was that ”after provision 
for the widow* men were given shares which were considered equitable 
in view of the holdings they had already while women were admitted 
only in respect of great personal need” (Cunnison:li35).
The major form of distribution of animals is through 
donations, particularly from father to son. These commence in 
childhood, and with the Humr continue spasmodically till the son’s 
animals amount to sufficient, through the process of natural 
increase, by the time that he reaches marriageable age (Cunnison:l:34). 
There is no special donation around the time of marriage, and 
marriage is not delayed for such reasons. Whereas, the Kababish
father is in a strong position to delay, if not the marriage of 
the son, then the establishment of his separate household^ -for the 
largest and final donation that a Kababish man makes to his son is at 
the time of the son removing his bride from the tent of her mother 
and establishing her in her own tent (Asad:74). "The amount that he 
gets at this time will depend on his father's capacity and the 
temper of personal relations between them* But it will usually be 
enough - together with what he has been able to amass previously - 
to enable him to provide for himself and his wife and any young 
children he may have* (Indeed the young man will usually delay 
the removal of his bride from her mother until such time as he is 
certain that he has sufficient animals of his own to maintain the 
new household)« (Asad:74). The structural strains indicated by 
change in property relations appear to lead to a radical alteration 
in relations on the occasion of the son's marriage, which may 
provide a crisis to the authority of the father*
This crisis appears to be not of the same degree as that 
described for the Bedouin father by Emrys Peters. Here the crisis 
is such that "the father feigns aloofness from the start of the 
negotiations until after the wedding celebrations have ended"
(Peters: 1965; 122), and even after the wedding celebrations are 
complete, there is maintained a fiction that nothing has happened. 
Each morning the son must leave his bride's tent and be at his 
father's side as previously, and he continues to eat with his 
father. In effect, this means that "marriage does not mean the 
immediate creation of a wholly separate domestic unit. Save for
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the appearance of a new tent, the ordinary ran of daytime activities 
is scarcely altered*' (Peters:123). And in that important aspect 
of father-son relations, property, the marriage of a son leads to 
no alteration. fit this stage there is no transfer of wealth
from father to son, either at the time of marriage or after; and 
the son must await the death of his father to come into his inheri­
tance. This is, in fact, the clue to the degree of the crisis that 
is felt, and the stress that there is to maintain the fiction of 
nothing having happened.
Although political authority over a son is divided 
between the father and the agnatic corporation (Peters:127)* there 
are yet discrete areas of authority that remain to the father. "In 
the tent his authority over the son is so overwhelming as to keep the 
son in almost complete subordination. The son is referred to as a 
slave, and in daily life has to behave as one. He must obey every 
command, for, were he to rebel, he would find little or no support 
among his agnates, whatever the extent of the provocation." The 
alternatives to accepting the dominant authority of the father are 
few; to move means losing the chance of gaining animals in the 
future and the son has none of his own until the death of the father. 
And the only chance of earning animals of his own is to work as a 
shepherd with some other group. This would mean losing status, 
not merely in talcing on employment, but also in forfeiting his 
agnatic rights within the corporation.
So, despite the fact that the son is unable to 
proffer effective challenge to his father at the time of his marriage,
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the marriage of a son is the first attack on a bastion of authority 
that is so tight and absolute, that it strikes as a crisis. The 
tightness and absolute control of the father over his son rests 
ultimately on his continued control of property, and so his authority 
continues beyond the time of marriage. But marriage also introduces 
other realignments in relationships and creates new relationships, 
of which most important is that of the groom with his father-in-law. 
Despite the continuance of his legal dependence on his father, and 
his continued economic dependence, the creation of a relationship that 
is nearer to him than to the father permits some manipulation that 
was previously not open to him, "a Juan can cajole his father-in-law, 
and (through his wife) wealth, in the form of animals may pass from 
the former to the latter" (Peters:130). Despite his continued 
dependence, the son has gained some power through the network of 
his relationships having altered, and part'now being focussed on 
him independently of his father. This enables him to manipulate 
one link against another.
So, where a large part of the father1s continued authority 
rests on maintaining his economic dominance over a son, then it is 
likely to follow that the more opportunities the son has for inde­
pendent accumulation of wealth, the greater is the challenge that 
is offered to the authority of the father. And such a crisis 
becomes manifest where the passing of wealth from the father to 
the son is not the gradual accumulation of the Humr, but the 
spasmodic donation of the Kababish, with the single greatest amount 
being tied to the time of marriage. However, unlike the Bedouin,
- 7 “
■where the first moment of such challenge is in the opening of 
negotiations for the marriage of the son, the crisis for the 
Kababish can be presented earlier. "The Kababish sons have 
alternative means for accumulating sufficient animals to marry] 
they do not have so much to lose by working as shepherds.
In both societies, the theory is that the father should, 
by the time of the son’s marriage, be able to provide him with 
sufficient animals, This is a problem for all but the wealthiest 
households, and is one of the greatest tests of the viability of a 
household, that balance between the resources available to a 
household and the demands that are being made on those resources by 
the members of the household (Stenning:1958). yfriere the 
resources of a household are manifestly insufficient to supply- 
future demands, among them the demands of a son for his marriage 
provision, alternative means must be found. And where such means 
imply the economic independence of the son, then a radical alteration 
in that aspect of father-son relations which is based on domestic 
authority has taken place. A Kababish father who is unable, or 
unwilling, to provide for his son, faces a crisis, in that the son 
can withdraw his labour from the household. By contrast, many 
Humr young men have left the camps to work on wage labour, and to 
build up their herds through cash earnings] and yet this appears 
not to be such a crisis.
It is impossible to estimate exactly the extent to which 
households break up in the time prior to a son’s marriage. But there 
are certain precipitating factors that operate differently in the
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two societies. The Humr camps that Cunnison studied appeared to be 
facing a particular shortage of animals at the time of study* and 
the households were forced to cluster together around those with more 
cattle. In the previous history of the Baggara* there have been 
constant relations with market-centres, which provided the essentials 
of diet which the cattle-herding Baggara could not themselves provide. 
Consequently* the migrations of the tribe have been along the belt 
of land that is ecologically suited to cattle-herding* and that is 
in some proximity to the market-centres (Cunnison:l:2). Now* the 
pattern of trading of cattle and household surplus is focussed on the 
market-centre of Muglad and seasonal migrations are within range of the 
weekly markets that are held In Muglad and other places (Cunnison: 1:28). 
So* a recent development has been that men facing a particular shortage 
of cattle at any one time can now work for wage labour in the market- 
centres* and build up their own herds through their cash savings.
Those most likely to be affected by such cattle shortage are 
the younger unmarried men* in the surra of ’Iyal Ganis* men of both 
camps were away earning enough money to start herds (Cunnison:l:79)> 
and they are thereby removed from their fathers’ household, and return 
only to establish their own households when they can marry. This* 
however* is not the crisis that it would be either to the Bedouin 
father* or to the Kababish father* for certain interests in 
returning to the natal camp remain. It is in the natal camp that 
a young man has agnatic rights to pasture and through his father 
that he inherits cultivable land (Cunnison:l:75)* But a far more
pragmatic approach to agnatic shares is maintained than is true of 
the Bedouin. It is only within a broad outline that a cattle-owner 
chooses where he shall camp* and there is a conspicuous lack of 
territorial divisions among the Humr. ’’Throughout the year Humr 
exploit their joint rights to grazing and surface water and tolerate 
the exercise of these rights by others. Significantly the ohly 
disputes over the use of grazing which came to my attention were 
not amongst Humr* but were between Humr and various other groups 
that use their country” (Cunnison:3-:27). The only property rights 
specifically attached to the home camp are the tracts of cultivable 
land that are passed from father to son* ’’Hurar have communal 
grazing rights over the whole of their country but they own garden 
land as individuals: whereas in a broad sense grazing land is 
abundant, land suitable for cultivation was in the past comparatively 
scarce. Individual ownership gives garden land a special meanings 
more than any other place the Humrawi nomad looks upon his garden 
land as his ’home1” (Cunnison^-a:74). All other wealth, namely animals 
and rights to grazing, is mobile. I am inclined to question how much 
longer the pattern of young men leaving for short periods of wage 
labour and then returning to build up their herds will continue.
But at the time of Gunnison’s writing, it seemed that this was 
the pattern.
Sons return to their camps, with their herds, and they 
then establish their separate married households. But this has 
presented little crisis to the father in another aspect, that of
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the son’s absence having removed his labour. If the son were 
absent on wage labour, one could presume that there was a shortage 
of animals in his household. And this would mean that less labour 
was required than in other households of more cattle. But more 
significant Is the fact that for the Humr, the primary cattle- 
herding unit is not the family household, or even a group of 
cooperating households, ’’Cattle husbandry involves cooperation on 
the basis of the camp . , . cattle herding invites large-scale 
cooperation, and in some circumstances a few members of a camp 
have a joint responsibility for all the cattle. At all times the 
members of one camp recognize general responsibility for all their 
cattle” (Cunnison:1:66). In neither property nor in labour 
considerations does the removal of a son present a crisis to the 
Humr father on the scale of that presented to a Bedouin father*
Nor is it of the same scale as that for the Kababish 
father; father-son relations are more internalised to the domestic 
sphere in Kababish households and are consequently more vulnerable 
to change in any aspect of these relations. The Kababish fathers 
attempt to operate property considerations to force a son’s 
decisions; and at the time of marriage, they are vulnerable to 
the possibility that the son might move to the camp of his affines, 
talcing with him his labour and animals. But the strategy that is 
open to a man of property differs widely from that of a man without 
property.
Again, inheritance plays a small part in the total 
distribution of animals within the economy; and trade operates In
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a different manner from in the Humr economy* The Kababish are 
not moving in close proximity to large market-centres and their 
main provisions are purchased in varying quantities and at different 
times of the year; ”the Kababish need cash for consumption and not 
production” (Asad:33)j and the two transactions of selling animals 
for cash and the purchase of essential commodities are typically 
quite separate* The sale of animals is in the long-distance trade 
of camels, and the irregular sale of small animals such as sheep and 
goatqy; brings in the cash necessary for consumption. But there is 
a "virtual absence of the practice of using cash to found a herd . • 
. . most nomads either possess sufficientranimals to subsist on or 
find it fairly easy to acquire animals directly in Bar Kababish 
without having to secure cash first through temporary employment 
in towns” (Asad:15)* Vfithin the economy, redistribution of animals 
is through donation and contract; the second being the means by 
which men without animals are able to build up a herd sufficient 
to maintain a household* And contracts for herding are the means 
by which sons whose fathers cannot provide sufficient Animals can 
independently gain their own herds.
Where a man has few or insufficient animals for his own 
needs then he seeks work as a herder and becomes attached to the 
household of a richer man. This does not imply any permanent 
dependence, for the basis on which relations are established is 
contractual. The owner gives an agreed number of animals to the 
herder in exchange for his services; and often herders move between 
households. This amount of animals given accumulates by natural
increase, and poorer households concentrate on those animals of 
greatest natural increase, sheep and goats, and exchange camels 
earned by herding for the smaller stock. Animals can be earned 
through odd jobs, or through regular herding^ And the second is 
the alternative ’’favoured as a solution by young men from poor 
households who have no hope of acquiring animals from their own 
fathers. In this way a young man who detaches himself earlier from 
his parent household relieves it of part of its burden” (Asad:53). 
The problem to be faced by household heads in the Kababish economy 
is twofold, not merely maintaining a sufficiency of animals, but 
also to ensure an adequate supply of labour to cope with the 
seasonal differential demands.
The labour allocation necessary for herding the different 
animals is one that must be faced by individual households, and not 
by any corporate group who are economically cooperating, And it is 
this factor that creates a demand for herders, and thereby gives 
poorer households the means to adjust their insufficiency by earning 
more animals, and sends their sons out earlier to earn their own 
herds. But it also creates a crisis in those households that have 
sufficient animals, for the withdrawal of a son’s labour could be 
crucial in herding management of the father’s household. It is 
for this reason, allied to the custom of the father withholding the 
sons’ portion till the time of their marriage, that the marriage of 
a son creates a crisis^ for once the son has received his portion, 
he is independent, and free to move away if he chooses. There is 
nothing apart from attachment to his natal household to retain him
in his natal camp* And where a son estimates that his better 
interests lie in removing to the camp of his bride, and to working 
with his father-in-law, then he will do so. Abdallah, in the case 
cited by Asad, pp. 95-99, decided to remove his sheep to the camp 
of his bride, and to assist his father-in-law in his herding.
Despite the general feeling that he should remain loyal to his father, 
or at least make some provision for him, the fact was that other than 
personal sentiments, there were no constraints on his leaving if he 
chose to do so.
It is only for the Kababish fathers that the moment of 
marriage of a son comes as a crisis, and among the Kababish fathers 
it is only these who can provide for their sons. The moment of 
marriage comes as a crisis to those fathers who can provide, for 
they attempt to use their final donations as a weapon to force the 
decisions of the son. Crucial in these decisions is the question 
of where he will reside, for the problem of labour allocation is 
endemic to almost all households (Asad: 122) and the removal of a 
son would precipitate an internal crisis. By contrast the Humr 
manner of allocating animals obviates a crisis arising, and the 
Humr father faces no critical problem such as that of a Kababish 
father. In neither case is inheritance the precipitating factor 
of crisis.
If inheritance is not the deciding factor in the property 
relations between fathers and sons, then no more can it be in male- 
female relations. Women are discriminated against in both legal 
and customary terms in property rights, but it is not inheritance
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that is the most important feature of this discrimination, Women 
are subject to disabilities in inheritance in both societies: in 
neither society do they inherit land or rights to land. And in 
relation to animal wealth* they have effectively no rights at all,
‘•In inheritance . . . • all Sudanese Muslims are legally subject 
to Sharia rules. But in practice, the foimal rules followed by 
the Kababish are very different and , » . , the amount inherited 
by women is insignificant, for women rarely possess more than a 
handful of animals at any given time'1 (Asad:69 and 71), "Islamic 
law accords a number of disabilities to women and in maty respects 
Humr custom gives them fewer rights’* (Gunnison:2:24). But I have 
already stated that the prime means by which animals are distributed 
through the two economies are other than inheritance. The fact is 
that women do possess some animals, though t h y  are consistently 
fewer than those of men,
Each of the means by which animals are distributed involves 
women to some degree. Humr women have access to animals through 
donation, and through cash purchase. Kababish women receive animals 
in donation, and are given animals in part of the marriage arrange­
ments. They also have their own form of property, to which they 
accede on marriage. This is the tent in which the new household 
will reside, and a minimum of household goods. But prior to marriage, 
the number of animals that a woman possesses is dependent on the 
generosity of her father. "Soon after birth, the father gives a 
cow or a cow^-calf to his child of either sex. This is the *cow of 
the navel*, for the navel-string is cut and tied to the animal’s
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tail. A girl has no other customary gifts in childhood"
(Cunnison: 1:34). A Kababish man "donates animals to his daughter 
(especially at birth, circumcision and marriage) and to his 
wife. But these are invariably few in number, and usually 
consist of odd sheep and goats", (Asad:75). In no case are 
the animals of a woman sufficient to maintain a household, and 
the animals of the Kababish women are subject to the demands of 
the male who is herding her animals.
After marriage, the means by which women obtain animals 
can diversify. Humr woman has access to cash from the surplus
of the household provision and this cash can be invested in more 
animals that she can hold in trust for her children, particularly 
her daughters (see next chapter). And a Kababish woman who is 
married receives animals from friends and relatives on various 
occasions, particularly from guests who have been entertained 
(Asad:75). But at all times, women are subject to the management 
control of men over their animals. And arrangements as to which 
men shall herd their animals must be made.
While unmarried, any animals they possess are herded 
along with those of their father and brothers j and the most frequent 
arrangement is for their animals to remain with the natal herds when 
they marry. In the case of the Humr women, this is an aspect of 
the continuing interest and responsibility that their male agnates 
retain in them. A woman who marries out of the natal camp leaves 
behind her cattle to be herded with her brothers. "Humr give two 
reasons for this custom. Firstly it is a kind of insurance against
- 1 6 -
the day whan the girl may be obliged to part with her wealth as
compensation, when she marries, she remains squarely in her natal
lineage, who continue to be responsible for her, morally, economically
H
in a broad sense, and legally. The only responsibility of which 
they are relieved on her marriage is that of day-to-day maintenance. 
They remain responsible for her debts. Secondly, they retain the 
cattle as an insurance, more generally, against the girl's old 
age, and the minority of her children" (Cunnison:i:93)* Such cattle 
as are left are known in her name, and she may claim them at any 
time that she should return. Leaving the cattle with her brothers 
is indeed an insurance not only for her agnatic kin, but an effective 
insurance for the woman herself.
The arrangements that are made for the anaiiials of Kababish
h
women are more problematical. On her marriage they are left behind 
in her father's herd, and any more animals that she accumulates are 
herded with those of her husband. But in neither event does she 
have the insurance of them being retained for her later use. Those 
herded with her father are "acquired on his death by her brothers 
who hold them nominally in trust for her in the event of divorce.
In the long run these animals are in effect assimilated into the 
property of her brothers" (Asad:9l). And the management of a woman's 
animals can become the bone of contention between a father and his 
daughter, or between a husband and his wife. Ultimately, the only 
choice that a woman has is whether her animals should be herded by 
her husband or her father. 'This gives rise to tensions such as 
were manifested in the argument between Hamid and Zaynab over how
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the animals should be allocated in a particular instance. Important 
in this discussion was the participation of Amni, the married daughter 
who was visiting. Hamid recognised that her dilemma lay* in whether 
to leave her animals with her father, and risk his taking what he 
considered necessary or to remove them, and have them assimilated 
into his herds. At least in leaving some animals with her father, 
she retained some lever to operate against her husband (Asad:87-39).
The arrangements made over herding the animals of a married 
woman and the manner in which such arrangements continue indicate the 
changes that occur on the occasion of a woman*s marriage. A Humr 
woman retains the interest and overall responsibility of her agnatic 
group; and only gradually becomes incorporated into the kin of her 
husband. The Kababish woman leaves her natal home and becomes subject 
to the almost total authority and management of her husband. Once 
beyond the initial stages of marriage, the assumption is that the 
Kababish husband has assumed responsibility for her maintenance and 
her moral welfare. A Kababish woman moves from one focus of domestic 
authority to another, for familial relations are largely internalised 
to the domestic sphere.
The most important change that occurs in the realignment 
of male relations at the time of marriage, is the assertion by the 
son of his economic independence from his father, lifhere familial 
relations are contained within the domestic unit, this means that 
the son has also asserted his freedom of his father*s authority.
So marriage for a young man is clearly the definition of his adult 
status when he accedes to his majority, and gains autonomous
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political status as a household head. This is the culmination of 
the fourth phase in the period between the birth of a son, and his 
attainment of jural adulthood, if one considers a person*s life cycle 
in the context of the domestic group and its development (Fortes: 
1958:9). Of these four stages the last is that in which the person 
is admitted to the “politico-jural domain**. “This confers on him 
actual or potential autonomy in the control of some productive 
resources, the elements of jural independence, rights of access 
to ritual powers and institutions, and some rights and duties of 
citizenship, as in warfare or feud . . . .  the culmination of the 
fourth phase is marriage and the actual or incipient fission of the 
natal domestic group.** ( ) As the Bedouin example has shown,
this last fourth phase can be long drawn out where “actual control,, 
of some productive resources*' is strictly limited by having to wait 
for inheritance. And the other two examples have shown that marriage 
can end any sharing of common interests between father and son, 
where they have no corporate economic cooperation, nor corporate 
interests of other kinds to bind them together. A Kababish son 
achieves actual autonomy at the time of his marriage, and asserts 
his majority status. A Humr son also achieves actual autonomy, 
but continues to share corporate interests with his father.
Women are classified as permanent minors both in jural- 
political status and in the underlying economic base, where they 
remain dependents. So for a woman, marriage has a different 
meaning. It provides, as for the son, the definition of her adult
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status; in the sense of her now being mistress of her own domestic 
domain, separate from her mother* And also like the son, new links 
are created around her, which are no longer mediated through her 
parents* The combination of these two factors frees her of the 
effective authority of her mother and allows her to make claims 
within her domestic capacity, and may permit for the extension of 
the influence she has, as a married woman, outside the domestic 
sphere, and into public decisions.
The relationship of mother and daughter is particularly 
intense in these two societies where there is marked sexual segregation, 
and the daughter is consistently confined within the private domestic 
domain of her mother's household prior to her own marriage. This 
intensity is mitigated to an extent by the constant involvement of 
women from different households in shared tasks, and the support 
that they offer each other at time of crisis* But at all times the 
relationship between mother and daughter is seen as one of special 
significance. The loss that a mother experiences in the marriage 
of her daughter is recognised in the payment of bridewealth to the 
mother; and a measure of a mother's power is the extent to which 
she can influence the tiding of and negotiations for the marriage 
of a daughter.
The intensity of the mother-daughter relationship arises 
through the consistency and prolonged nature of the life that they 
spend together from the time of the girl's birth and infancy to the 
time of the girl's first marriage. These are societies where 
the sexual division of labour is such that a girl, unlike a son,
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does not leave the matri-centred domestic domain in the later stages 
of childhood, From about the age of seven, boys begin to participate 
in the male tasks of herding and the care of animals and the relations 
of a son with his mother then modify. This is the "third stage 
of childhood", as Fortes would call it, vjhere the sexual division 
of roles and activities becomes effective. From now on "boys are 
attached to their fathers and girls to their mothers" (Fortes: 
op, eit.:lO)» and the new range of tasks to which a son is intro­
duced is indicative of his maturing to jural-political status, and 
to economic independence*
The ties that exist between mother and daughter are of a 
constancy and endurance that cannot be cited for other familial 
relationships. As stated, those between a father and his son are 
modified according to the stage reached by the son in his life-cycle. 
And the son's relations with his mother are modified even earlier 
when, by his participation in male tasks, he is no longer subject 
to her demands for assistance in domestic chores, nor constantly 
present in the private sphere of the household's tent. The father's 
relations with his daughter are compounded by the clear division of 
labour that exists between tham? though this is to an extent 
modified where, as is true of the commoner ICababish, the father 
is dependent on the daughter's labour in some herding tasks. But 
by contrast, a mother and her daughter are constantly resident 
together in the privacy of the tent, working together, with the 
mother training her daughter to the higher skills of those domestic 
tasks, and gaining increasing support and assistance from her.
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Mother and daughter are rarely separated till the time of the 
daughter's marriage. All these factors combine to induce ties 
between mother and daughter that are of a strongly affective 
nature. And these ties continue after the marriage of the 
daughter, with the mother demonstrating reluctance to lose her 
daughter and her moral support, and the daughter seeking the 
advice and support of her mother in the early stages of her 
marriage.
The special ties that exist between a mother and her 
daughter are recognised in both societies. Humr men adopt a 
specially affectionate attitude to the children of their sisters, 
make special arrangements to ensure that a girl continues to 
reside with her mother till her marriage, and recognise the 
continuing influence of a mother in early marriage. But the 
particularly strong role of senior women among the Humr is 
noticeable at an earlier stage* in the participation of the 
mother in the courtship of her daughter. "The girls have good 
allies in their mothers, and indeed in other close female rela­
tives, who are all concerned that courting should be possible . .
. , Mothers and daughters, who sleep on the same bed, have many 
many secrets in common; and if the suitor seems to the mother to 
be a satisfactory person, with a brave or wealthy father, she gives 
him consent to enter (the tent)" (Cunnison:d.:28). Such participation 
in the courtship of a girl is possible through the more open life 
of the Humr women. For, as Cunnison says, "they lead a very open
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life and the form of their camps prevents segregation. They never 
go veiled, while they are guarded with some severity by their men 
there are ways around this" (op. cit.:25)« And while his argument 
must be modified to be able to account for the participation of 
brothers in the courtship, it is certainly true that the mothers 
of marriageable girls can compromise potential suitors.
It cannot be merely the mothers and senior women who 
connive at the courtship of a girl, for the suitor in order to enter 
the tent must pass by the father and brothers who sleep outside 
(Cunnisons£L:47). They are the moral arbiters of an unmarried girl, 
and it is a matter of shame to them if someone succeeds in courting 
their kinswoman. So, the mother, in permitting a suitor to enter 
the tent compromises not only the suitor by allowing him to enter, 
but also must have some tacit assent from the male kin concerned*
(This is a point for which I am indebted to Professor Peters, who 
refused to accept that brothers were unaware of a girl's Gourtship).
A successful suitor is therefore compromised by the 
mother's participation in the secret affair; and it is not surprising 
to find that Humr men bewail the rapacity of females, and bemoan 
the constant interference of the mother in the daughter's marriage 
(Gunnisonv- 2l:2.7-28). And this is by deliberate contrast with the 
usual reference to women as female agnates, and to their children.
The sister's children are a matter of particular interest, and the 
possibility of a sister marrying into another camp is a matter of 
great concern. Noticeable in this concern is the particular affection
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that is held to exist between the children and their mother's 
brother; this is by contrast with the father's sisters, who, it 
is thought, "tend to share in the father's more authoritarian 
attitude" (Cunnison:i:92). Moreover, among the children of a 
sister, particular attention is paid to the daughters as opposed 
to the sons. It is felt right that a girl should continue resident 
with her mother. Special arrangements are made for the return of 
a son at the age of seven or thereabouts to his official guardians, 
where the mother is living away from his father's kin (Cunnison:
53 and 56), although this provision is one that can be waived in 
the best interests of the son (see the example of 'Ali:56)«* But 
no mention is made of the return of a daughter. This would be quite 
against the prevalent philosophy concerning women, which recognises 
their special role in being the source of affective, non-authoritarian 
roles, centred on the person of the mother and her kin.
The evidence that I can collect from detail given by 
Asad is more fragmented and inconclusive* I suspect that daughters 
are singled out for special concern when children are returned in 
the event of a marriage breaking up, but have no evidence. However, 
it is consistent with the greater internalisation of familial 
relations among the Kababish that the marriage of a daughter 
presents even more of a crisis to the mother, than is true of the 
Humr mother, Asad claims that "many women, especially those with an 
only daughter, attempt to delay the removal of their married daughter 
for as long as they can" (Asad:63)* And this attempt relates to the 
serious loss of moral and physical, support that the daughter's
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removal implies, and to the mother*s lack of being able to 
ensure that the daughter continues to reside close to her. 
tven when the daughter marries a man living nearby*, the continuity 
of camping patterns is so slight that she may well move further 
away*
The loss that a mother experiences is recognised in 
both societies by the payment of bridewealth to the mother. This 
can be interpreted as some compensation to the mother for the loss 
of domestic services that the groom gains and the mother loses 
(Asad 1 6 2 ); and this undoubtedly refers more to the mother than to 
any other figure. She has the effective authority over her daughter 
till her marriage and the only claim to her services 5 but in marriage 
the groom acquires these services as a right. This bridewealth is 
limited in number, and is mostly swallowed up in the wedding expenses, 
but is an important indicator that the person most closely involved 
in the marriage of a daughter is the mother. It is essential to 
contrast those changes that take place in the father^ relations 
with his son at the time of marriage, with those of a mother and 
her daughter.
The marriage of a girl is the first change that takes place 
in her status and establishes her as an adult personality in her ovm 
right. From this time her status changes further as she becomes the 
mother of children, and as these children, in turn, grow to marriageable 
age. V?hen considering the status of women in these two societies, it 
is essential to remove purely static consideration of their rights
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as defined by law and custom. It then becomes possible to study 
the dynamic processes by which a woman, in performing her primary 
role as a child-bearer and provider of domestic services, changes 
her status further in the course of her marital history. It also 
becomes possible to consider how such changes can provide her with 
a power base from which she can operate.
Section B; The Ages of Women
It will by now be clear that I am making no reference to 
the possible roles that are open to women who do not marry. Analyti­
cally, it is impossible to account for such women and to make 
reference to them. There is no evidence presented in either mono­
graph of how many women remain unmarried, and the prevailing 
sentiment expressed by both Humr and Kababish is that all women 
must be married and as early as possible (Asad: 6 3 ). The only 
reference that I have found to this topic is in the article of 
Emrys Peters, where he accounts for the "remarkably high number 
of women" who "are destined for a life of spinsterhood", among the 
learned Families of a Lebanese village, and compares their lot 
with the miserable one of the single spinster that he met among 
the Bedouin. "Her lot was a miserable one3 lacking any rights to 
property she was forced to rely on the compassion of her near 
kinsmen", whereas "spinsters of the Learned Families may come to 
occupy positions of eminence" (Peters:S.D.:54). Their different 
position lay in the fact that as women they inherited property
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equally with men and "where women are permitted to inherit and 
wealth is available for transmission, spinsters are likely to hold 
high status" (op. cit.;55). Moreover, the interests of their class, 
in ensuring that the property should not pass out of their control^ 
lay in preventing the spinsters from marrying. It was property 
considerations that prevented these women from marrying, and then 
gave them high status, and a degree of independent power.
I have already made clear that I consider inheritance to 
play a smaller part in the distribution of wealth in the societies 
of the Kababish and the Humr, and also that inheritance can there­
fore play a reduced role in male-female relations. Furthermore, 
it is in the interests of no one for a woman to remain unmarried. 
The only possibility would be one such as the solitary Bedouin 
spinster, who "was found to be sexually deformed on the first day 
of her nuptials" (Peters:S.D.:54) and their lot would, like that 
of the Bedouin woman, be miserable^ -for spinsters would remain 
permanent dependents, and not acquire the status and power of 
married women. A new age opens for women in these two societies 
only with their first marriage, and until then no change can occur 
in their status.
On marriage, a woman acquires a new bundle of roles 
that permit her to make claims in her own right and that establish 
her as an independent personality. She becomes the mistress of 
her own domestic domain, has the potential of motherhood, and is 
the mediator of links between men. Each of these factors creates a 
dependence of men upon her^ and this dependence becomes the source 
of her power.
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The sexual division of labour is such that the provision 
by a woman of domestic services in her own tent is not merely a duty 
but a right. And all men in order to gain these services must live 
in the tent of a married woman. Xt is only on the occasion of 
her first marriage that a woman acquires the tent and household goods 
that are her own property (Asadi37» Cunrdson:&.:2 6 ). And no man can 
provide these services for himself, through the attachment of 
feelings of shame for a man to carry out the work of a woman. A 
husband is therefore dependent on his wife for the provision of 
such services and in exchange for these services he provides for 
the maintenance of the household and its dependants. Moreover, a 
husband is dependent on his wife for provision of sexual services, 
and for the birth of legitimate children. His successful marital 
career is dependent on his wife, and the potential that she has for 
motherhood. And the source of a woman* s power lies not so much in 
the threats that she can make to withdraw her services as in the 
continued everyday dependence of her husband.
This everyday dependence is compounded by her role as a 
mediator of links between men, And this ultimately is the real 
source of a married woman1 s power. Where she lacks this role, or 
where it is severely restricted, then her power base is limited,
.for, as I shall explain, the source of women’s power lies in the 
set of claims that they can make over men. Where this set of 
claims does not develop in the course of her marital career and 
becomes more complex, then her power is limited both in degree and 
range. Marriage is the first qualification for this set of claims
to develop, for a married woman becomes the focal point of a 
network of links with men.
The mediatory role of a woman in marriage is one that 
is highlighted by Emrys Peters in his consideration of Bedouin 
marriage. All Bedouin women have this role in marriage, and for 
some it is of overt political significance, while for the majority 
it serves to differentiate between agnates of the corporation.
Within the corporation, marriage can serve the economic strategy 
of a woman’s father, or of the groom. But "the argument that a 
woman in marriage mediates relationships comprehends all marriage 
whatever the particular form it takes or the territorial distance 
it covers" (Peters:S.D.:37). The political significance of this 
mediatory role is overt in marriage between corporations and gives 
high status to the woman involved. A woman is endowed with high 
status through the payment of a high bridewealth, and this enables 
her to become a kind of chief woman of a camp. "She occupies this 
role because the responsibility of mediating a major political 
role has been allocated to her. Other women may succeed in becoming 
prominent in camp life, but they do so largely by virtue of their 
individual personalities, and my evidence is that they succeed 
only in the absence of a woman who occupies the role of political 
mediator" (op. cit.:22). The problem of whether such women of 
prominence do emerge in the camps of either the Humr or of the 
Kababish is one to which 1 return (see Chapter Three).
For my present purpose, the mediatory role with which 
I am concerned is that relating to men's economic strategy. Within
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the corporation of the Bedouin^marriage serves to ’'differentiate 
between agnates" and a euphemism used for marriage is "malting a 
relationship", specifically an affinal one. "Relationships between 
a man and his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various 
ways in different situations. Here the particular aspect which 
needs to be stressed is that a man can cajole his father-in-law, 
and (through his wife) wealth, in the form of small animals, may 
pass from the former to the latter" (Peters:1965?130), So that 
a son who remains economically dependent on his father has some 
degree of independent strategy opened to him through manipulation 
of his affinal links. The continuance of such interests is 
dependent on the continuance of the marriage, for it is through 
the marriage that the differentiating links are maintained. In 
order for the marriage to continue, the claims of the bride must 
be met.
The claims of a bride lie in her links with men, and 
her power lies in the economic interests that are served in the 
continuance of the links that she mediates between men* So the 
first principle to establish is that the claims she acquires 
through marriage do not cause earlier links to lapse. When 
earlier links do not continue, when new ones are established in 
marriage, then marriage does not provide a mediatory role, but a 
mere transfer of a woman from one man, or group of men, to another, 
Humr marriage clearly fulfills this mediatoiy role, for agnatic 
interests in even those women who marry away from the camp continue,
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and within a camp a special relationship is acknowledged between 
a man and his father-in-law* But for the Kababish, the mediatory 
role of women in marriage is not so clear. Their links with natal 
kin appear to lapse after some time, and except in those instances 
where a man's economic interests lie with his father-in-law, the 
mediatory role of women in marriage is strictly limited.
The case of Abdullah, see page 13 , was an example of
how a man uses the new relationship created by marriage to his 
own advantage. In this case the continuing interests of the
wife were considered^ For as Asad states, "he did not inform his father 
that he had married the girl on the understanding that he would not 
remove her far from her mother" (Asads97)* However, the decision 
was related more to the groom's own advantage than to the ties that 
continue between a mother and her daughter; for "this latter 
difficulty might have been overcome in time had Abdallah been eager 
to live near his father. He was, however, unwilling to do this, 
partly because of his grievance that, in the past, his father had 
appropriated his animals unjustly, and partly because he anticipated 
that he would receive more assistance in the future from his father- 
in-law than he would from his own father" (idem).
With the Humr also there can be explicit enonomic reasons 
for particular marriages, and for continued residence near the 
father of the bride. The daughter of Hurgas, the leader of the
t t
main camp of 'lyal Ganis was married to Abu Dik, who had chosen to 
reside in the main camp, rather than in the splinter camp, where 
his father's brother resided. Abu Dik was a poor man who had
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married after his elder brother had failed to have children in his 
failed marriages. And his hope was that through marrying Hurgasf 
daughter, "in great hardship he can rely - if not on his account, 
then on account of his wife and her children - on his richer affines" 
(Cunnison:a:79). The wife of Abu Dik, like the wife of Abdallah, 
had a mediatory role that could to an extent be a source of power 
to her, for in order for these strategic marriages to be maintained, 
the claims of the wife, and her specific desires^must be met.
"The difference between the women of the two societies 
is clear when they are not resident in their natal camps. In the 
case of a Kababish woman, her power is then effectively confined to 
her husband's dependence on her services in the domestic domain, 
whereas a Humr woman carries with her the continuing interests of 
her natal kin. Most indicative of this is the provision that is 
made for children that are born of a marriage, and how this affects 
the property of a woman. No marriage is considered complete 
until the birth of children, and the period between a woman's 
marriage and the birth of her children is one that is kept to a 
minimum. Consistent with the fact that the interests of male 
natal kin in a woman are effective for only the early stages of 
a marriage, is to find that provision for children is strictly 
laid down, and cannot operate through a woman* And conversely, 
where a woman as a female agnate retains the interest of her 
agnatic male kin throughout her life, provision made for children 
is not so strictly regulated*
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In the event of a marriage breaking up, and divorce 
following, after the birth of children, a woman normally retains 
with her the children that are infants. And in moving back to 
the household of her father or a brother, provision must continue 
from the father or his kin. The Kababish mother leaves behind any 
animals that she has accumulated for her sons to inherit, and it
is expected that the son will be returned to the father when he
is old enough (Asad:91). (No clear statement was made by Asad with 
reference to daughters, and where they are expected to reside). So 
that the Kababish woman can make no economic gain from a divorce 
and possible subsequent remarriage. A Humr mother is in a radically 
different position, for not only do the rules apply more pragmatically, 
but she continues to receive maintenance for her children from their
agnatic kin, may well keep her son with her, and is sure to have her
daughter with her till the time of her marriage (Gunnison r2.: 2 6 ).
I3y these means the contrast between the women of the two societies 
is becoming clear. The Kababish woman is always dependent on one 
man effectively, and constantly subject to his undivided authority, 
while resident with him. The Humr woman, as she acquires further 
status in marriage and motherhood, frees herself of dependence on 
one man alone, and gains thereby a freedom of choice that is not 
open to the Kababish woman. A woman who has had a complex marital 
career may well free herself of dependence on any one man, and 
through the provision made for her children, specifically her 
daughters, be able to reside where she wills, rather than with her 
closest male kin (see next chapter).
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Being a mother has the potential of creating new links from 
which a woman may gain power, but as I have shown this is limited for
Ol
the Kababish mother. However, in considering the ages of^wom'an, it 
is essential to consider how motherhood changes her status. Once she 
has children, the chances of her marriage continuing are increased, 
and her security of provision being made for her is ensured. A 
marriage is not considered complete until the birth of children.
The removal of a Kababish bride from the home of her mother is 
frequently delayed until this time (Asad:5 9 And reference is 
made by both Gunnison and Asad to the early stages of marriage 
being fragile, with the chances of success increasing with the 
passage of time and the birth of children.
But apart from the time element involved, there are 
other important senses in which the status of women change with 
motherhood. They are now not merely the links between men, but 
also the link between generations. And whereas there is an 
element of competition in the intergenerational relations of 
men, with the son ultimately usurping the authority of the father, 
the links that women provide are those of continuity. Especially 
where elaborate agnatic genealogies are not remembered, descent 
through women becomes important. This was what Asad found when 
he asked the Kababish young men about their agnatic links. In 
answer to his questions, they would reply that they could "tell 
you the names of my mother1 s kin and my fatherfs mother* s kin, but 
I cannot tell you the names of our distant ancestors'* (Asad:106).
And where women are remembered as female agnates, the links that
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they provide between generations becomes even more significant; 
men are concerned that proper care should be taken of the children 
of their sisters (Cunnison:i:92).
A mother also has open to her a degree of security that 
did not previously exist. As the mother of infants, she is the 
source of their care and upbringing and provision must be made to 
her for these children. As long as her children are dependants, 
and continue in residence with her, she is assured of maintenance.
And as her sons mature, she is assured of maintenance in the future, 
"because in the event of divorce or widowhood in old age she can 
expect to be cared for in the household of one of her independent 
sons" (Asad:65), ,fA widow or divorcee with a son over the age of 
about fourteen is looked after by that son and usually she lives in 
the camp of her former husband (for there her son is at home) rather 
than with her brothers" (Gunnison:!:47), A married woman without 
children returns to the care of her brother, but with him she has 
not the position of senior woman in a household. And a woman in 
this position has no recognised rights in how the affairs of the 
next generation are arranged.
The culmination of a woman's ageing .comes when the children 
she has borne are reaching marriageable age^ for she then has a 
recognised status as a mother whose wishes must be consulted, and 
as a senior woman whose relations with men have eased with the 
passage of time. This also is the period in vhich the set of claims 
that she has over men becomes most complex, and when she is best
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able to manipulate the different links between men to her own 
advantage. And in comparing the power potential of women in 
these two societies, it is crucial to my analysis to compare the 
status of women as matrons, the mothers of children of marriageable 
age. Hie Humr women by this stage have a recognised public
and political role to play, whereas the Kababish women continue 
in their essentially private and domestic roles. The Humr matron 
can wield considerable power in decisions concerning her children 
and can combine with the other women of the camp to force men to 
action. The Humr matron has achieved a set of claims that is 
complex and wide in range. But the Kababish matron does not and 
cannot. In the process of a Kababish woman ageing, those claims 
that she creates in the course of her marital career cause others 
to lapse.
Section 0: The Power of the Matrons
Implicit in the analysis so far has been a distinction 
that should be made^the sphere of influence that is open to all 
women who are married, and the possible extension of that range of 
influence to involvement in decision-making outside the bounds of 
the domestic domain. All women who are married have some degree 
of influence, for their husbands are dependent on them for the 
provision of services which they cannot themselves provide; and 
this influence relates therefore to the interdependence of conjugal 
roles in a society where strict sexual division of labour operates.
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This interdependence allows for a woman of strong personality to 
exercise great influence over the decisions of her husband that 
relate to her own interests in property, or to her children, 
especially her daughter. But for there to be any security of 
her being consulted in these decisions, other pressures must 
operate, and these relate to the other resource that women have 
in the development of their power potential. This lies in the 
strategic interests that are involved in the continuance of a 
particular marriage, and the continuance of effective links with 
men that a woman can operate in her interests. Vrhere effective
links continue with men other than those with whom she is presently 
resident, she has some claims which she can make. The more complex 
the set of these links that focusses on a woman, the greater are 
her chances for power.
The importance of strategic interests in a marriage, and 
of the continuance of other links with men have already been indi­
cated^ .-for on page 1 referred to the arrangements that were 
made over the property of a woman when she marries. Bven the 
Kababish women had some sanction to operate in the threat of 
removing animals from the household of the father, and the Humr 
women are welcome at any time in the camp of their agnates. And 
the case of Abdullah on page IS indicated the strategic interests 
of the groom and father-in-law inlhe marriage as arranged. But not 
all marriages have either such strategic interest or the continuance 
of effective links with other men involved, and these marriages 
reduce the range of a woman's influence to her domestic domain.
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The best measure of a woman's power lies in the time of her rnatron- 
hood, for it is then that she will have consolidated her marital 
status by having borne children, and will have the greatest 
opportunity for exercise of her power. If the set of her
links with men has been able to develop, it will then be at its 
most complex, and there will be some chance of her exercising the 
claims that she has in the interests of her children, most 
importantly her daughters. And the clearest index of a woman 
having matured to power in her matronhood is to estimate how far 
she can influence the course of events surrounding the marriage 
of a daughter.
True of the senior women of both societies is the effective 
authority that they can exert over their daughters within the domestic 
domain. However, the power of the Kababish matron is strictly limited 
by two factors, her containment within her domestic domain, and 
resulting subordination to the authority of the household headj and 
by her inability to combine with other women in any form of public 
action. This containment may well lead to a woman of strong 
personality exercising great influence over her husband, as Asha 
was accused of by the agnatic kin of her husband Hamid (Asad:119)5 
but unless she has close links with other men who are involved in 
some action, her influence cannot extend to any public decisions.
It is significant in respect to Asha, that the man who was most 
restrained in action on this occasion was her uterine half-brother.
But for most Kababish women, the lack of structural continuity in 
resident units and the lack of agnatic solidarity removes any
public concern in familial relations, and likewise reduces the 
range of her influence.
By contrast, the Humr women as female agnates, and the 
object of corporate responsibility have a distinctly public role 
to play as married women and matrons. They lack any overt political 
role (even in the sense to which Peters refers, see page 2&, 
where women who mediate particularly important political links 
are given high status from the marriage itself), and there is no 
sense of a hierarchy of status for women other than that of age 
and marital status. The women of the Humr camps combine in camp 
hospitality, a public event which gives them an opportunity to 
participate in public decisions, and as matrons they can combine 
in opposition to the men over negotiations for the marriage of a 
girl.
The clearest contrast in the power of the matrons 
of the two societies is seen at the time of a marriage. The Humr 
matron has the absolute right of final decision, whereas the 
Kababish matron must accept the decision of her husband.
The Humr mother will frequently have connived at the
courtship of her daughter, and thereby have influenced the course
of events. Her consent is necessary for the marriage of a daughter, 
not merely as a formal acquiescence but also because she can 
prevent a marriage taking place, A suitor makes her a few presents
to begin with, but as the time of marriage approaches nthe old
woman steps up her demands, and the negotiations over the amount
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of money to be handed over as bridewealth, which she conducts 
directly with the bridegroom^are apt to be harrowing for him11 
(Gunnison: 2:28). At the final stages she combines with other 
women of her family to demand the payment of bridewealth, and 
the last stages of negotiations are not conducted between the 
men of the two families, but by the men of both families in 
opposition to the women. "The men of the girl's family show little 
interest in trying to fix the bridewealth until at the end they 
attempt to persuade the mother to be reasonable in her demands" 
(Cunnison:l:95). And Gunnison categorically states that "the 
final word is that of the bride's mother absolutely. One way 
she can try to stop a marriage that she or her daughter do not 
want is to refuse to lower the price" (fnsibid). As a matron, a 
Humr woman has a high degree of control over negotiation which 
comes to her through the bridewealth payment being not merely a 
nominal payment and purely symbolic of her status as matron, but 
being the subject of bargaining. The bridewealth is not distributed 
among the men of the family, but retained by the mother and put 
toward wedding expenses. Any surplus remaining is hers to allocate 
as she wishes. The other women become involved not through material 
interests but through the solidarity of the women of a camp, for 
where camps form corporations as they do for the Humr, then the 
women as female agnates and affinal kin also share corporate 
interests. They have a public role to play in camp hospitality, 
and can combine to spread the reputation of men.
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Griven the corporate public role of the women, and given 
the recognised interests that they have in their daughters and the 
marriage of daughters, the Humr men cannot deny the matrons the 
decisive voice in the marriage of a girl, The Kababish men can 
and do3 for although the bridewealth is negotiated between 
bridegroom and bride's mother, hers is not the final decision 
about the marriage taking place. The father retains the right to 
give consent, and this is "more than a passive right of veto, for 
a man may himself indicate his daughter's marriage to the person 
who will in his view prove himself a suitable son-in-law. And 
the affinal relationship established between a man and his son-in-law 
is a purely personal one, based on their mutual concern for the 
welfare of the bride" (Asad f 64). I question the last statement, 
as X consider that many Kababish marriages are arranged with more 
of an eye to the economic strategies of father and son-in-law 
than purely to the welfare of the bride. But the other >points 
are valuable^ for they indicate the limitations that the Kababish 
matron has to individual action even at this time. She continues 
subject to the effective authority of her husband and the father 
of the bride, and unless the father's interests are also served 
by the mother's delaying tactics in negotiations, she will be 
unable to effect any change. Bach decision taken comes to rest 
on the operation of purely personal factors, and while this allows 
for women of strong personality to have great influence, it serves 
as the limitation to the power of most women.
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Women in both societies pass through age statuses 
which culminate in matronhood. But it is clear that the patterning 
of their power within this status is different in the two societies. 
It remains now to explore more closely why it is that the set of 
claims that a Kababish woman can develop remains constantly so 
much less complex and more restricted than that of a Humr woman.
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Section As The Division, of Labour Within a Household
Within households of these two economies, division of 
labour is on two simple criteria. Work is allocated to and persons 
are trained to carry out tasks according to their age and their 
sex. Among children, the differences become clear as they mature. 
The son is trained to those tasks that are part of the male, public 
sphere, and which will eventually bring him economic autonomy. The 
daughter is trained to those private domestic tasks in which she 
increasingly helps her mother, and which eventually she carries out 
in her own marital home. Such sexual differentiation in tasks 
serves to maintain the logic of male-female roles, where men are 
not merely the jural-political majors, but are also the providers 
of dependents. Women remain as the dependents of men, for they 
are denied not only legal majority, but also the economic means 
by which they can assert any independence.
The functional aspect of strict division of labour 
between the sexes is to ensure a mutual interdependence between 
the sexes, for men cannot carry out the tasks of women, any more 
than women can carry out the tasks of men. But more than that, 
it also divides the sexes into mono-groupings in terms of the 
assistance that can be proffered at time of crisis. Whereas 
it is clear that in both economies the men of households are
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reliant at times on recruiting support from other men, it is 
not so evident that women are likewise dependent on other women.
I maintain that it is necessary to look closely at the support 
that is offered between women, and whether this has any economic 
aspect3 for where exchanges of different kinds are being conducted 
between women, this may be independent of any control by men.
Age is relevant as a criterion in two senses. It is only 
as children leave the earliest stages of their childhood, that 
sexual division of labour becomes relevant. And it is the most 
senior person within a household that allocates the tasks that 
must be carried out. In the earliest stages of childhood, where 
both son and daughter are contained within the matri-centred 
domestic cell (Fortes :195s), little distinction is made between a 
boy and a girl as they develop their physical capabilities and 
become strong enough to carry out some range of tasks. They 
are subject to the effective authority of the mother and assist 
her in her tasks. But as soon as the son reaches the age where 
claims over him by kin are relevant then he also participates 
increasingly in male tasks which remove him from the domestic 
domain of his mother. For, as is clear for the Humr, the age of 
physical ability for a child to participate in male tasks is 
also the age at which his agnatic kin can exert their jural 
rights. At the age of seven, a son begins to join in herding 
tasks, and this is the time when his kin, if he is living 
separately, can claim his return (Gunnison:1:53). This assertion
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of claims can involve the physical removal of the son from his 
mother if she is separated from the pater, and thereby indicates 
the maturing of the son, a process -which ultimately removes him 
from the sphere of the mother*s authority. The physical removal 
of the son in such a case amounts to a more dramatic statement 
of what is usually a gradual developnent j for a mother always lacks 
jural authority over her son, but this only becomes relevant in 
the course of his maturing physically and socially.
By contrast, a daughter would never be removed from her 
mother in this way. Given the strict division of labour between 
the sexes, the mother remains the appropriate person to train and 
educate the daughter from the time of her infancy till the time of 
her first marriage. This is the time when the rights of agnatic 
kin over a daughter first become relevant, with the right of the 
father's brother's son to first refusal in marriage (Asad:5#j 
Cunnison:l:90). Until the time of her marriage, the daughter and 
her mother are locked together in their mutual minority and 
economic dependence. And in the uninterrupted development of 
their shared interests and tasks, their relationship has a unique 
consistency. This unique nature of their relationship is 
recognised by the men of both societies (see page -ll ), and is 
the basis for the development of solidarity among other women.
One aspect of the strict division of labour between the 
sexes is to create not only an interdependence between men and 
women, but also a potential solidarity of interests between 
members of one sex. Most indicative of this is the continued
- 4 5 -
support that a girl seeks and finds in her mother after marriage,- 
and the continual exchanges that are conducted between women of 
neighbouring households.
The sexual division of labour in these two societies is 
based on an inner logic, which does not negate the other functions 
that it fulfills. The logic lies in the fact that these are both 
societies where all people are expected to mariy and have children, 
and where a premium is thereby put on parental roles. Specifically^ 
the emphasis on marriage and parenthood serves to define the dominant 
roles of women in terms of their maternity, and thereby to limit 
the range of roles that are open to them (Nadel:1957*61). For 
unlike some other societies, such as Western industrial society, 
where it is possible to separate out some stage of a woman's 
life where she can have an independent economic career (Myrdal: 
1968:13), these are both societies where the maternal phase of 
a woman's life is most likely to be the longest and most enduring* 
Any pre-marital career is precluded by the early age of marriage 
and the strict control exercised over unmarried women. No 
marriage is considered complete until the birth of at least the 
first child, and from that time on, most women are closely 
involved in the bearing and rearing of children. Maternity
involves not merely the bearing of children, but also their 
rearing, boys till about the age of seven and girls till the 
time of their first marriage. It is therefore logical to
find that sexual division of labour should be based on the initial
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principle that women are trained to and carry out those tasks that 
are most nearly compatible with their maternal roles.
But once the inner logic is viewed, it does not negate 
the other functions of the division of labour between sexes. The 
strict sexual division of labour within a household serves to 
maintain the interdependence of male-female roles which are based 
on inequality, for it ensures that men are as dependent on women 
for the provision of certain services, as women are on men for 
their maintenance. And, outside the household, sexual division of 
labour creates the potential of solidarity between members of 
the same sex.
One side of the argument relating to the consistency of 
male-female roles has been presented by several writers, particularly 
focussing on the logical fit of the economic dominance of men with 
their social dominance (see Nadel:1954;S Cohen:1969$ Smith, M.G.:1962)* 
Increasingly the strains that are inherent in a situation of 
change, especially where women are gaining a new economic autonomy, 
are becoming a focus of analytical concern. Where women can 
effectively offer a challenge to the former economic dominance of 
men, some conflict in sex roles is likely to arise, for the new 
independence of women and resulting removal from the absolute 
dominance and authority of the men is rarely compensated for the 
men by other factors. Such conflict in sex roles is one that 
Nadel analyses as latent in the antagonism between the sexes 
where men are created the socially dominant sex, and which becomes
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manifest under certain conditions of change. j.f the social
dominance of men is reduced by economic factors such as the 
development of a market system, and the opening of trade in cash 
to women, this is likely to lead to women either “exceeding" 
their proper roles as wife and mother, or to their rejecting 
such a role (Nadel:1954:175)* Where women are able to achieve 
either such "excess" or "rejection", men must find some compen­
sating factors. And Nadel analyses the predominance of fears 
of evil female witches, and their association with the market 
system of the women as an indicator of a basic antagonism 
having developed into conflict of sex roles among the Nupe 
(op. cit.:169-131).
Basic to this transition from the latent antagonism 
to open conflict was the change in the economic power of women*
For the Nupe woman now had open to her a market system of trading 
which gave her economic freedom end independence. Her husband 
could become indebted to her for loans, and also dependent on her 
for provision made to the son (op. cit.:174) and a challenge was 
offered by the women to the congruence of the men having both 
economic dominance and domestic authority. The man's proper
status as “breadwinner" was reduced by his wife's independence, 
and his authority was further reduced by a richer wife's inheritance 
being of greater importance than his own* In terms of action, this 
meant that women were able to exert greater influence not only over 
the men who were officially their providers and guardians, but they
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were also able to usurp their authority over sons and daughters, 
who became dependent on inheritance from the mother.
The balance between sex roles, based on the dichotomy 
of women as dependants and giving of certain services to men, and 
men as providers but dependent on women for these services within 
the domestic domain, had broken down. Although, as X demonstrate 
in the next section, the Hurar women have achieved a degree of 
economic autonomy not open to the Kababish women, they by no means 
offer such a challenge to the men. Both Humr and Kababish women 
remain dependent on men for provision in a household; this 
dependence is maintained by the sexual division of labour which 
in these economies excludes them from the economically profitable 
tasks for the most part. And yet it is the same principle of the 
sexual division of labour which ensures that men remain dependent 
on them for domestic services, for the duties of a woman to 
provide services within her domestic domain are conceived of as 
a right. Men are precluded from attempting to provide domestic 
services such as for cooking themselves, except at the rare 
intervals where they are absent from the camp on long herding 
trips, and they can only receive such services in the tents of 
women who are, or have been, married. Men are precluded by the 
feelings of shame that would be associated with their indulging 
in female tasks beyond the earliest stages of childhood (Asad:44; 
Gunnison: 1:47-48). But even more they are precluded by the fact 
that "the abrogation of a particular task by men would be interpreted
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by women as the loss of a right" (Peters: 1965: >37 ). Each of the 
tasks of a woman is her prerogative, and a sign of her independence 
within her domestic domain. It is only on marriage that a 
woman frees herself of the effective authority of her mother, and 
is able to conduct her range of domestic tasks within the domain 
of her tent.
The strictness with which the sexual division of labour 
operates differs between the two economies, for it is found that 
the Kababish women are regularly expected to proffdr assistance 
to men in the male tasks of herding, whereas the Humr women play 
no part in herding. But the rule that men have no part in the 
tasks of women remains intact and the work of women tends to be 
greater than that of men if one considers the cycle of work through 
which a household will pass (Asad:47). And this dependence of men 
on women for carrying out some of their tasks compromises the 
division between the sexes for outside assistance. In the case of 
the Kababish, the emphasis on the independence of the nuclear 
family household units leads to men avoiding, if possible, the 
recruitment of other men at times of labour shortage* This leads 
to the women being asked to involve themselves in herding tasks, 
and to a greater dependence of the head of the household on the 
women to maintain his herding policy. But men never participate 
in the tasks of women, and women are frequently unable to manage 
independently of any outside assistance. Where members of one 
household cannot turn to each other for assistance at times of 
crisis, then they must turn to neighbours or friends. And in the
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analysis of Kababish camp life, it becomes clear that the women 
of different households,unable to rely on men for assistance^, 
create and maintain relations of mutual aid with women of 
neighbouring households (Asad:128, 131). One important aspect 
of the sexual division of labour has remained intact for the 
Kababish; the men do not participate in the tasks of women.
Women are reliant on each other at times of crisis, and this 
applies by clear contrast with the position of men. If the 
sexual division of labour were strictly carried out, then this 
solidarity of the women would apply to men also.
This solidarity of the women in terms of the aid that 
they can proffer each other in time of crisis centres on the 
close links that are maintained between the women of one family 
when they are separated by marriage. The closest and most enduring 
link is that between a mother and her daughter, but also sisters 
can seek to remain near each other after their respective marriages. 
And where households of the separate women remain near each other, 
in the same camp for example, the pattern of visits and exchanges 
made between the different households is clear (see Asad:45).
Where a daughter remains close to her mother the continued 
influence of the mother, to whom the daughter turns for advice 
and assistance has already been indicated (see p. H  ). And 
even where mother and daughter are separated by camps, there is 
maintained a pattern of visiting, encouraged by the seasonal 
movements of the camps, which might well bring the women,closer
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to each other at certain times of the year (Asad:22). The need 
for these continued close links between women lies in the nature 
of the work which is allotted to them in their domain. Theirs 
is the responsibility for raising and educating the young children, 
caring for the sick, and ensuring that at all times the household 
is supplied with food and drink. It is in the nature of this 
responsibility that crisis can strike at any time, and usually 
is unpredictable. So that unlike the cycle of men's work, 
which tends to follow the seasonal demands for labour in herding 
and watering, the work of women is increasing and liable to crisis 
at any time, and some insurance must be made for other women to 
come and aid in times of need.
It is for these reasons that among the women of a camp 
there is a constant interchange of visits and small exchanges, 
especially of food items. Each woman is concerned to ensure the 
readiness , of other women to assist. And among the women of a 
cainp, certain women will exchange more frequently than others.
These will be the women who are kin and/or neighbours. Tfhere 
mother and daughter remain close together, the pattern of exchange, 
intervisiting and assistance will focus most closely on them.
However, the pattern of exchanges between women of a 
camp although contributing to the cohesion of cainp life, does not 
have any important economic aspect as compared with the exchanges 
between men. The potential for developing the network between 
women of different households as a base for economic exchanges and
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for inter-household trading is not one that has been developed.
No woman becomes the centre of a large accumulation of credit, 
and the extent to which they can independently accumulate wealth 
is strictly limited. Although the Humr women are able to make 
some profit from the provision made to them by their husbands, 
and are also able to use this profit to invest in animal wealth, 
it is never sufficient in itself to provide any degree of economic 
autonomy. The only important aspect in which the links between 
women operate in the economic relations between men and women is 
in relation to the mother's trusteeship of animals for her daughter. 
This only occurs among Humr women who are separated from the agnatic 
kin of their daughters. As I have indicated, women in all cases 
remain with their mothers till the time of their first marriage.
This involves not only that the daughter goes with the mother in 
the event of marital separation, but also that some kind of 
provision must be made for her, by her agnatic kin. This provision 
is mediated through the mother, who is given a number of cattle, 
the title of which is vested in the name of the daughter, and the 
children of the daughter. And the mother retains the use and 
increase of the animals that she has in her keeping (Cunnisonil:3^). 
The only women who become the focus of important economic links 
are those who have many animals in their keeping. And the chances 
of this happening are confined to those women who have gained 
trusteeship over animals belonging to others.
True of both societies is the continued economic 
dependence of women on men, for although some degree of economic
- 5 3 -
autonomy is open to Humr women, this can only come as the result 
of accumulation over time, and does not present any real challenge 
to the main dichotomy in sexual roles, Where the two societies 
differ is in the degree to which women participate in the main 
sphere of tasks. Labour allocation is a real problem to the 
heads of the Kababish households, and they come to rely on women 
assisting them to some degree in their tasks. Although the Humr 
women participate in more aspects of the economy, they are not 
expected to help in what is defined as the male sphere of herding 
and care of animals.
In the Kababish example, it would seem that sexual 
division of labour has broken down to an extent, and that this 
alters the pattern of dependence of men and women, for a 
Kababish man is closely dependent on his wife for her labour, 
and also on the subsidy that he gets through her being helped 
by other women. But no woman in either society is dependent 
on any man for assistance in her tasks. The female sphere remains 
intact.
Section Bi The Extent to Which Women are Involved in Tasks 
Relating to Production
It has sometimes been maintained that the single most 
important change in the economic status of women comes as a result 
of households no longer being production, as well as consumption 
units. “Ibis results in women either gaining an independent
role by working for wages themselves, or in being restricted to
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domestic tasks, and their labour consequently being devalued by 
removal from production. It is assumed that where women are still 
parts of producing households, productive tasks may be
compatible with their dominant concern in maternal and domestic 
roles. In my two examples, this is confirmed, for the confinement 
of women to that range of tasks most nearly compatible with 
their dominant roles does not necessarily remove them from the 
productive process. Their Involvement in production is determined 
by the nature of the economy.
It is true that in nomadic pastoral economies an amount 
of productive activity must be conducted at a distance from the 
home base of the, tent and the camp. But for the greater part of 
the year the distances covered by men in their herding tasks do 
not remove them from the camp for any length of time. And in any 
case, the proportion of time spent away from the camp depends on 
the nature of the animals herded, and the other factors that must 
be taken into account in herding policy. The women of the camps 
are most closely involved in such tasks as centre on the home base 
of the tent, but this range of tasks can include some cultivation, 
and certainly includes the milking of animals which can be the 
base of a household's supply of cash.
The logic of the premise on which the sexual division of 
labour is based has been proved^ both in terms of the primacy of 
maternal roles, and in the consequent duration and intense involve­
ment by women in the domestic familial domain. Such involvement 
is not merely nominal, but implies a deal of hard work. Cunnison,
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Asad and Peters all comment on this fact, suggesting that the 
cycle of work is different for a woman from that of a man, and 
that the older women are grateful for the assistance that they 
receive within a household from the younger more able women.
The toil of women is unceasing and continuous, involving the 
everyday routines of food preparation and serving. In addition, 
there are the large variety of tasks relating to the care of 
the children. And also the periodic repairs and maintenance of 
the tent and the household goods. And the assistance that a 
woman can receive from other women in the household tends to be 
in inverse proportion to the work-load at that stage in the cycle. 
For the woman with the greatest work-load is one who has several 
small children, with none yet old enough to be of any real assis­
tance j the woman with the smallest is one who has several daughters 
nearing the age of marriage. And, as compared with the men, there 
is little seasonal pattern to her work-load. Some alteration 
occurs at the time when watering the animals is most difficult, 
and long distances must be covered to the water-pointj but overall 
the great majority of her tasks are daily and not seasonal in 
routine (Peters: 1965: )3&-i3$. j Gunnison:. 2 : 255 Asad:43~47).
The primary roles that women fulfill and the tasks that 
they perform as an aspect of such roles, require their almost 
continuous presence within the tents. And the spatial immobility 
of women within the camp is to be compared with the frequent 
movement of men. In fact, women can be absent on visits to other
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camps and at times in trading ventures. But in such an event 
arrangements must be made for another woman to provide the men 
with domestic services. This presents Kababish households with 
something of a problem tAsad:44j9 and Kababish men try to prevent 
women going away for extended visits. Piy contrast, it seems 
relatively easy for a Humr man to attach himself, either temporarily 
or permanently to another household tCunnison:l:48}. But in either 
case, the general principle is that the women are permanently 
resident in the camps and close to the tents. And this is a 
point essential to the social organisation of nomadic pastoralists^ 
for there are times of the year when not only mobility, but also 
dispersal are necessary. At these times, the herding units become 
separated from the camping units and the mobility of the animals 
is utilised to range as far as possible in the search for water 
and pasture. Now, the camps, centred on the tents occupied by the 
women and children^become the real base and communication centre 
of the dispersed units. The further that the range of mobility 
of the animals extends at such times, the less likely it is that 
women will be involved in their everyday management, for they will 
remain with their tents in the camps. Consistent with this prin­
ciple is to find that the Kababish women are precluded from any 
management or involvement in tasks associated with the camels, 
although they assist in the watering and herding of sheep and 
goats. And also consistent is to find that the Humr women cannot 
be precluded from involvement with the single animal of their 
economy, the cattle.
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The nature of these two economies is such that even by 
virtue of those tasks that they carry out relating to the consumption 
demands of a household, women are involved in production also. It is 
in virtue of their domestic role3 that man make provision to them of 
the staples of the household dietj chiefly millet and milk, with some 
meat. The Kababish grow no millet, but must purchase it through the 
sale of their surplus animal production* The Humr cultivate some 
millet, but rarely sufficient to meet household demands, and the 
rest is purchased through cash, which Is the source of everyday 
supply to the household. And the women of the Humr are involved 
not merely in the cultivation of the gardens that lie close to the 
camp, but also in the sources of everyday cash on which the house­
holds depend. The Humr women are fully involved in the process of
production by helping to cultivate the grain that is consumed, by
\
milking the cows, and then processing the milk products, the 
surplus of which may be sold for cash, and which forms the basic 
supply of everyday cash of the household. Moreover, a woman in 
a richer household, with a larger number of cattle has access to 
surplus in the milk products that she makes. The cows must
always be milked except when in calf, and the proportion that is 
consumed within the household lessens as the milk supply increases^
So that her milk products can be sold in the market for cash, 
which she may use as she wishes, and even invest in cattle. The 
limitation to a woman's independent source of income increasing 
with the wealth of her husband comes if he should marry again, 
and the allocation of milk from the herd then be divided equally
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with the other women (Cunnisonsl:48). But it is an important point 
that Humr men cannot so closely control the household provision of 
women as can the ICababish men.
Tbe Kababish have a mixed animal economy, from 
certain spheres of which women are effectively excluded. Women 
are excluded from trade, and confined to tasks relating only to 
the smaller animals of goats and sheep5 they therefore have little 
chance of accumulating surplus from the provision made to them, 
and even less of any independent investment. Like the Humr women, 
an important part of everyday provision in a household is a regular 
supply of milk. For this purpose all households keep a number of 
goats close to the tent, and it is the responsibility of the women 
to milk the goats twice a day, and to prepare the milk not consumed 
as clarified butter (Asad:44), Any surplus that she may have after 
household needs have been met she may sell, and in those households 
that have many goats, this surplus might well accumulate. However, 
goats are animals that are the smallest unit of value for sale and 
for exchange, and household heads with any surplus seek to exchange 
goats for sheep and ultimately for the animal of greatest prestige 
and value, the camel (Asad:15 and 52). The sheep women cannot 
control so closely, for they have to be herded at times away from 
the tents in search of the more succulent pasture that they require. 
And camels, within a wealthy household, would be the source of 
important investment. Camels are the animals over which women 
have least control, for they are herded away from the tent, and
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their range of mobility is utilised by the man in the season of 
shortage. So, within a successful household, the pattern of herding 
policy operates against the possibility of a woman*s provision rising 
proportionate with that of her husband. The form of investment 
that men seek to make is away from those animals in which women have 
closest control and which could provide them with an important source 
of income.
The Kababish women are ultimately dependent on the 
generosity of the men with whom they are resident; for the provision 
made to women in respect of their domestic roles can be closely 
controlled and part of a deliberate herding strategy* The men 
control the herding of sheep and camels, and also the purchase of 
the grain which is the staple of a household*s diet. And in this 
way the Kababish women, though part of producing/consuming units, 
are diverted into those spheres that deal with consumption more 
than production.
This could in itself be an important source of power to 
women, if hospitality, the sharing of consumption with others, were 
an important concern in the everyday management of a household, for 
where hospitality is extended, women are involved and must have 
generous provision made to them. It is true that Asad lays stress 
on the importance that Kababish give to the extension of hospitality 
to guests, because the presence of a guest calls for the display of 
lcaram - the offering of at least a minimal quantity of food and 
refreshment. ‘'Indeed such generosity reflects on the host’s
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honour . . . .  and the more generous he is the greater the honour he 
brings on himself and his household" (Asad:39/40). But such extension 
of generosity is closely limited by the calculations made about those 
who have outstayed their welcome, or who are constant malingerers in 
a household. "Visitors who habitually outstay their welcome in the 
hope of being present when the food is served are publicly criticised" 
(ijbidl) and the Kababish "assert the manifest reasonableness of refusing 
a visitor hospitality if the latter has previously denied it to the 
person he now visits or has behaved in a stingy or hostile manner 
towards him" (Asad:8 6 ).
Compared with the overwhelming importance that the Humr 
attach to their concept of "generosity", and their everyday concern 
with extending hospitality to either household or camp visitors, the 
Kababish seem to be singularly "ungenerous". A Humr man with cattle 
would be horrified at the idea of calculating whether his guest should 
be treated generously. Men move easily between different households, 
and can attach themselves to a household even when they make no 
contribution to it (Cunnison:l:48). And "whether he wants it or not, 
a man with cattle attracts followers to him - poorer kin who have 
perhaps no other camp in i^hich they can drink milk" (op. clt.;3 2 ).
And each member of a camp is involved in the extension of hospitality 
to camp guests. To refuse to help entertain a guest would be to 
avoid the obligations of hospitality, and to cause a split in the 
camp (see the splinter camp of Tlyal Ganis surra who entertained 
separately:72-74)•
In the calculations that the Kababish men make about 
hospitality, the potential role of women in publicly important 
entertainment, such as that of the Humr camps, is reduced. And 
their restriction to primarily consumption tasks does not therefore 
provide an alternative patterning in provision by men. The Humr 
women have a significant role to play in the politically important 
extension of hospitality. If they were restricted, like the Kababish 
women, primarily to consumption tasks, then this in itself would be 
a source of strength to them, for men to be generous in hospitality 
need to be generous in provision. However, they not only have this 
resource, they also play a significant part in production, and also 
in cash transactions that are made. Humr women cannot be excluded 
from the cash aspects of production aid they therefore have access 
to cash which they can use as they wish after household demands are 
met. Among the uses to which they can put their cash surplus is 
investment in the animal that is the source of wealth and of greatest 
prestige, namely cattle. It would seem that the Humr economy by 
concentrating on the herding of one animal is more vulnerable to the 
involvement of women in production and also to the possibility that 
the women may gain a significant degree of economic autonomy.
Section C: The Trade in Household Surplus
v7hen we turn to consider the part that women play in the 
trade of the two economies, and to their involvement in tasks 
associated with the sources of everyday cash supply to a household,
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this vulnerability of the Humr economy appears even greater.
The Humr women have some surplus in the housekeeping provision, can 
trade this themselves for cash, and can accumulate cash to the 
point where they can invest in animals, the title of which is theirs 
or of their children. There would seem therefore to be a whole 
sector in the economy over which men cannot exert control, and where 
women have a degree of autonomy that might lead to an effective 
challenge to the economic dominance of men. This supposition is 
encouraged by the way in which other authors have discussed the 
effects of women gaining a new economic role, especially in trade.
They make it clear that even some small shift in women’s economic 
potential can have disproportionate effects on men’s control of 
women. However, in considering this supposition, it becomes clear 
that the economic potential of the Humr women can serve to free them 
of the control of any one man, but does not thereby make them 
altogether independent.
Neither economy is self-sufficient but must trade in order 
to gain the basic essentials of diet, and additional items that they 
do not produce themselves. In this respect, they share a common 
characteristic with other middle-eastern nomads all of whom must 
have trading relations of one kind or another with settled peoples.
And as E. Bacon maintains, this places them ”in a pattern of symbiosis 
which ties them to the larger society of the Arab world” (E. Bacon;195i)* 
making them to some degree dependent on their relations with settled 
cultivators and the market centres. The Humr have always moved on the 
’’southern flanks of these settled populations (and) seem to have been
in two minds about the sultans . . . .  at times they fought them; 
at times they entered opportunist alliances with them. The nomads 
had no desire to pay the tribute the sultans would impose, but at 
the same time they were dependent on merchants and settled peoples 
in the sultans’ domains for certain goods” (,GunnisonilJ2). The 
Baggara were dependent on such markets particularly for grain, the 
basic to diet, which they bartered for liquid butter, and since they 
have settled in their present territory, they have regular relations 
with the market centres nearby. Weakly cattle markets are held at 
Muglad, Abyei and other smaller centres according to the season.
’•There is a good market for butcher meat in all the large towns of 
Sudan, and most of this is supplied from Baggara herds" (Cunnison:li36) 
The Kababish also must trade in order to survive, and their grain can 
be obtained either from the major market centres, or directly from 
cultivating villages south and south-west of Dar Kababish. The 
principal source of cash is the sale of livestock, and such sale is 
conducted through the long-distance trade of camels to Egypt, the 
sale of smaller stock in the markets to which they travel, and to a 
smaller extent by sale to the merchants in the larger damars 
Usad; 30-34).
However, as indicated, there are important differences 
in the pattern of trade as conducted by the two economies. Whereas 
the Humr have regular weekly access to market centres, and all their 
seasonal movements keep them within range of the markets, the Kababish 
vary the pattern of trade according to the seasons. When gathered in 
the summer watering-places, the merchants can do a "fairly brisk trade"
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but most of the buying and selling takes place just before or just 
after the rainy season. The purchase of the main provisions is in 
varying quantities and at different times of the year, mostly 
involving travel over some distance. And, as far as 1 can estimate, 
this seems to imply that, unlike the Humr who have established 
themselves in the most important trading centres, the Kababish have 
no regular trading relations with any one centre, or any degree of 
dependence on local merchants. At all times, they are able to use 
their greater mobility to travel to the places where sale and purchase 
is most favourable.
The two economies also differ in terms of how far cash has 
permeated as a generalised commodity and means of exchange. The cash 
interests of the Humr are rapidly developing in the use of cash to 
build up herds, the cultivation of the cash crops of millet and cotton, 
the regular trading and especially in the numbers of Humr men who are 
absent earning cash in the towns on wage-labour (Gunnison:l:63). And 
this process has been accelerated by the recent heavy losses suffered 
by some Humr, e.g. the surra of TIyal U-anis, where herds were depleted 
greatly. Those men who are away on wage-labour are assumed by Gunnison 
to be saving cash in order to purchase the herds which will be the 
basis of their later subsistence. By contrast, the Kababish have 
retained certain sectors of their economy intact from the monetarisation 
of exchange. Herds are built up through exchange within the economy, 
supplemented to an extent by the purchase of small animals. Those 
men who are short of animals can earn subsistence through attaching 
themselves as herders or hiring out their services on a temporary
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basis, and in exchange they receive animals, not cash* These 
animals they can build up and systematically exchange until they 
are able to own the animals of greatest prestige and with the 
single greatest unit of value - the camel. The camel, though
sold on long-distance trade, and an important source of income, is 
not bought on the open market. Moreover, no men are absent on 
wage-labour, for the means of adjusting a situation of shortage 
seem sufficient within the economy itself (Asad:15).
How such factors relate to women*s economic potential is 
in the effect that they have on the everyday sources of cash for 
household expenditure and provisions. For, as I have already 
indicated, women in these societies have no independent career 
prior to marriage, and once married are dependent on provision 
made to them in respect of their domestic and maternal roles.
Prior to marriage they can exert no control over property, but 
once married and established in their marital household, then they 
have control, at least in one sphere - that of the provision made to 
them. Customarily, it is the right of a married woman to dispose of 
any surplus that may accrue after household consumption demands have 
been met. But the chances of the women of the two societies vary in 
the possibility of their accruing surplus, in how this surplus is 
disposed of, and in what they may invest any such surplus.
In both economies it is the prerogative of women to process 
the milk products which are consumed within the household and which 
have some cash value in sale. The Humr women have an increased 
likelihood of such surplus regularly being found, through the fact
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that the provision made to them must be as generous as possible.
The larger the herd of her provider, the greater the amount of 
milk that can be used (see p. 5 7 )> and many households rely on the 
sale of milk products in the nearby markets as the chief source of 
everyday cash. These cash transactions are conducted by the women 
themselves in the markets, and any cash remaining from household 
demands is theirs to use as they wish. The first priority is on 
accumulating household goods for daughters not yet married, but they 
can also invest in cattle, the title of which is granted to their 
daughters or the children of their daughters. The Humr women 
therefore regularly handle cash, accumulate cash, and can invest 
in the most important animal of the economy, cattle. By contrast, 
the Kababish women are likely to have a smaller surplus in milk 
products, handle cash less independently, and cannot invest in the 
animal of greatest prestige and value. The smaller surplus arises 
through the fact that those households regularly producing surplus 
to consumption needs are highly unlikely to concentrate on goats, 
the milk-producers, as herd animals. The number of milk animals 
that a woman regularly has at her disposal is thereby controlled.
But some milk products are sold, though they never bring in enough 
income to provide for other household demands. The source of 
everyday cash comes in the sale of smaller animals, and periodic 
trips by the men into the market centres. The only time at which 
women conduct their own cash transactions is in the summer dammars, 
where men can continue to exert close control over their purchases.
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So that the likelihood of a Kababish woman gaining any economic 
autonomy through provision and gifts made to her is minute. At 
all times they are precluded from any significant accumulation, 
and therefore from any investment independent of their husband or 
father.
As indicated, the Humr women have not only trading 
possibilities, but also investment possibilities in the strategic 
sector of the economy. If the economy is in fact vulnerable to a 
challenge by the women of the men's economic dominance, then it is 
here that it will take place. As other studies have indicated,
it is not so much women's trading role per se that affects the 
former balance in sexual roles, but the possibility that this opens
up not merely for accumulation, but also investment. In some
situations, it would appear that even a small shift in women's 
economic possibilities can have great effect (see T.S. Bpstein: 
1962:318), for 3-n Wangala, the economic relations of man and wife 
have altered, "increasing the prestige of women within the new 
status criteria". But, where women also have investment possibilities, 
the changes are even greater.
The further that cash has permeated an economy as a
generalised commodity and means of ,exchange, the more vulnerable
it is to challenge of men's former economic dominance by those 
women who can earn and accumulate cash savings. Such challenge 
can be as effective as that described by Nadel for the Nupe.- For 
in this instance, many women, as traders, have built up their
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position to the extent where the men are heavily in debt to them.
The men rely on the women "for money for tools, for some unforeseen 
heavy expenditure, and even for such items as the brideprice of a 
son or funeral expenses, which it is the man's duty to defray" 
(Nadel:1954:174). Male authority is further diminished by 
another factor: for with the Nupe kinship organisation sons normally 
look to the father and male kin for economic support. But, as 
frequently happens, "where the mother is the richer, the inheritance 
she will leave will be at least as important, and even while she is 
still alive her sons or daughters will turn to her for financial 
help". This offers an effective challenge to the father's role, 
which is to meet the economic requirements of the household. And, 
as Nadel points out, "the economic independence of the women 
connotes the inadequacy of the men" (op. cit.:175).
This challenge to the economic dominance of men reduces 
their control over the women in other aspect s^  for the social 
dominance of men is inextricably bound up with their economic role. 
The Nupe men cannot exert the same moral control over the women 
as previously. "The woman traders are proverbially 'bad' wives and 
'bad' women, that is, women of loose and immoral character. Going on 
long journeys as they regularly do, they neglect their household 
duties and, while away from home, live the life of prostitutes" and 
even more significantly, the women traders are notorious for their 
desire to avoid having children. "It is they who are the most 
regular customers of the various dealers in ’contraceptives’.
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They thus pile one iniquity upon another, having chosen not only 
unchastity but that utterly unnatural and despicable thing, voluntary 
barrenness " (ib.id). The Nupe women have gained an economic role 
that is separate from marital status, and which permits them truly 
independent economic status. Their challenge is not merely to the 
economic dominance of men, but also to their social dominance. For 
they have gained this autonomy outside the constraints of marriage.
As long as women are dependent on marital status for any 
economic autonomy, and as long as their accumulation of wealth is 
directed into "harmless conspicuous expenditure", men can effectively 
exert continued control over women and their property, and the 
potential of the women for challenging their economic superiority 
is contained. The only women over whom the Hausa men cannot exert 
control are the prostitutesj and these are also the women that 
despite their "exciting, free and independent life" are not well-off 
but possess only a few "glossy gaudy dresses and very little, simple 
furniture" (Gohen:1969s66). Politically the prostitutes would seem 
a more significant factor than are the secluded, settled housewives. 
For the prostitutes have played a formalised and organised role in 
the politics of the Quarter, forming separate female branches of the 
two major south Nigerian parties, the NCNC and the Action Group. 
Whereas the housewives have not voted in any of the elections nor 
taken any part in party politics (op. cit.:63). However, behind 
the seclusion of the housewives important trade is operating, and 
the proportion of housewives to prostitutes has changed over the 
years with the number of housewives increasing. There are distinct
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economic advantages for a prostitute in marrying, and they are the 
second favourite choice of the men in marriage (the first being 
Sabo-born girls).
Immediately on her marriage a woman is entitled to a 
marriage payment and she can use this to start her own business.
As a housewife, she can regularly take ”cuts” from the household 
money, oyer which she has control. In addition, she has the profits 
of those girls, her daughters and fostered girls who sell in the 
streets of the Quarter. And the accumulation of these profits 
through the trade between the women of the Quarter is sufficient 
to permit many married women to amass a significant amount of 
wealth. In Sabo the main contrast that must be made with reference 
to the position of women is that ”the prostitute is free to participate 
in public life but cannot acquire much wealth. The housewife, in 
comparison, can accumulate a great deal of wealth”, (op. cit.:6 7 ).
Where wealth is accumulated, it can be invested in creating debt, 
and resulting relations of dependence. And it would seem that the 
Sabo women can unite politically as prostitutes, without any economic 
base, or remain divided as housewives, with a strong economic base.
However, as long as women are dependent 011 marital status 
for such economic base, then men can continue to exert effective 
control. In Sabo this control of men is aided by the seclusion of 
married women, which prevents them (as Cohen says) from entering 
into competition with men. But this is inadequate explanation in 
itself, for the wealth of women is sufficient for them to invest 
in those relationships that would reduce the control of men. (Compare
how the Nupe women in being able to aid their sons financially cut 
away at an important aspect of paternal authority). And this does 
not necessarily involve breaking the rules of seclusion. What is 
more relevant is that the wealth of women increases if they invest 
in female rather than male relationships, for among the ways that 
a married woman increases her wealth is to attract to her household 
young girls whom she fosters and uses to conduct her trade. Married 
women, instead of accumulating cash, which could be invested in 
either male or female spheres, restrict themselves to the female 
sphere by sinking their profits into acquiring ever-increasing 
numbers of Czechoslovak-made, brightly coloured, enamelled bowls. 
"Within the world of Sabo housewives, these bowls have become the 
most important status symbol and women are ranked in status in 
proportion to the number of bowls they possess . . . .  a housewife 
continues to accumulate bowls and when her own daughters or her 
fostered daughters get married, she gives them part of her treasure, 
usually in proportion to the length of time the daughter has served 
her” (op. cit.:67-8). By investing in their bowls, the women remove 
their wealth from the control of men, but they also restrict the 
range of relationships in which they can make economic investment.
The Humr women would seem at first sight to share more 
of the features of the Hausa women than of the Nupe womenj & r  
their economic status is dependent on their marital status. No 
woman until she is married has any control over her property, nor 
has she independent claims to make for provision (see p.(| ).
Part of her increasing economic status comes through the cuts that
she can make from household provision, and this surplus she can 
invest in what she wishes. For the most part, this is in household 
goods for her daughters, which they take with them when they marry, 
"At her daughters marriage the mother . . . .  will no longer be 
able to ride in caravan showing off her daughter and the fine goods 
that she has prepared for her, to all and sundry. Vftien her daughter 
leaves, taking the finest of the household goods with her, the old 
woman will simply be an old woman on a dirty bull laden with sooty 
pots that attract miriads of flies" (Cunnison:2:28). Like the Hausa 
married women, Humr women invest most in relations with their 
daughters.
However, Humr women also have access to the commodity of 
single greatest prestige and value in the economy, for they can 
invest money in cattle. In some cases this can free a woman of the 
control of any one man, if she has the use of sufficient cattle to 
provide for a household. And to this extent, the Humr women could 
pro-offer some sort of challenge to the economic dominance of the 
men. Kababish women are effectively precluded from any such 
challenge, as already demonstrated. But Humr women are strictly 
limited by one important factor. This is the continuance of the 
division of labour within the camps, which removes women from 
management control of their cattle. The men of the camp herd the 
cattle, and theirs is usually the final decision as to the allocation 
of beasts for sale, or for slaughter to feed guests. No Humr woman, 
as long as she remains in the camps, is free from the management by 
men of her property. Humr women are subject to the control of men
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through their dependence on marital status and in the continuing 
sexual division of labour* But unlike the Hausa women, who are 
strictly secluded in one household, and therefore subject to the 
control of one man, the Humr women can free themselves of the 
control of any one man, and can therefore exert influence over a 
wider range of decisions that are taken.
Section Di In Illustration of the Significant Difference between
the Economic Position of the Humr and the Kababish Women
Ihen one compares the composition of the different households 
comprising the camping clusters of the commoner Kababish, and the 
camps of the Humr, an immediate contrast is struck. f^l the
Kababish households are based primarily on nuclear families, with 
the addition of other dependants, mainly female kin of the husband.
All Kababish households are based on the wealth of men, and their 
dependants bring little additional property into the household. By 
contrast there are several examples in the Humr households where 
women, though nominally members of households headed by men, have 
a significant degree of autonomy in the running of the household.
And in at least one instance, that of the widow Hamidy of the 
splinter camp of 'Iyal G-anis surra, men had formed a household around 
the property of a woman. This occurrence is possible through the 
accumulation of factors that permits a Humr matron a significant 
degree of economic autonomy. In the course of her marital 
career, she is the focus of generous provision from men, the use 
of which she retains. This retention of rights to provision enables
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her to be mobile, and to accumulate a complex set of claims.
Whereas, the Kababish women have restricted access to provision, 
and have no chance of establishing a complex set of claims over 
men, which would ultimately remove them from the control of any 
one man*
Among the households that Cunnison described for the two 
camps of the surra of 'Iyal Ganis, was one which was based on the 
wealth not of a man but of a woman. This woman's wealth was 
sufficient not only to provide the economic base for a household, 
but also to be the focal point around which the whole of the 
splinter camp had clustered; and great enough to have been the 
economic base to the challenge offered to the main camp leader,
For this camp had broken from the main camp in the course of a 
dispute with the main camp leader, Hurgas. If they had not had 
any cattle, the splinter camp could not have formed, for they 
would have remained dependent on the cattle of Hurgas, the richest 
man in the main camp. Hamidy was the rich widow around whom the 
splinter camp formed, and the cattle was available to them because 
she had chosen to reside in the camp of her brother, rather than with 
her son. She had been able to take this decision because she was not 
dependent on her son, who would normally, as her official provider, 
have taken her into his marital home. And within her own household, 
she had a great influence over decisions that were nominally taken 
by men. Mot only were they dependent on her wealth, but she
had a great degree of autonomy in her management. The brother who 
was nominally head of the household was mostly absent for long 
periods, residing in the camp only when it was near Muglad
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(Gunnisom 1:6l). So that any action nominally taken in his name 
could only have been with the consent, if not at the instigation 
of Hamidy*
Initially it would seem that such a household offers an 
anomaly in terms of what I have been stating so far^ -for this would 
appear to be an ‘instance of a woman able to challenge not only the 
economic dominance of the men, but also their social dominance.
For Hamidy was undoubtedly richer than her brother, who was nominally 
head of her household; and was also richer than the other men of her 
camp. This wealth had given her freedom to choose where to reside, 
and by creating relations of dependence in the other men, had 
undoubtedly given her great influence in decisions taken. The 
vulnerability of the Humr economy to challenge by women seems clear. 
However, the manner in which Hamidy had accumulated her wealth 
indicates more of the limitations that are imposed on women, and 
that her case was truly exceptional. Hamidy had her wealth through 
having arrived at the status of matron, a woman with married daughters 
and the cattle of which she had use were not her private property, but 
in the title of her daughters and their children.
The cattle that she held were in trust for the children of 
her daughters; and this wealth had accumulated by various means. To 
begin with, she was herself a widow, and would perhaps have been 
allocated a small portion of her late husband's estate (see Appendix 2 
Cunnison:1:198-200) but would certainly have been the recipient of 
provision for her daughters if they remained unmarried at the time 
of his death. The proper place for her daughters, if not yet
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married, is -with their mother* Provision would be made for them 
in the shape of cattle in their name* and the use and increase of 
which Hamidy would have for herself. In addition, Hamidy would 
translate any surplus that she could accumulate from household 
production into the tent and household goods that each would require 
at the time of marriage. Hamidy had six daughters, each of them 
was now married, and two resident in her own camp, and one son who 
had moved to the natal camp of his wife (Gunnison si: 61), At whatever 
point in time that her daughters were married, i.e. before the death 
of her husband or after, she was the appropriate recipient of bride­
wealth paid by the grooms. As I have earlier stated, such bridewealth 
is in the form of cash and it is for the mother to allocate as she 
desires. A large portion will be put to wedding expenses, but the 
likelihood is that some amount will remain. like the cash surplus 
that she can gain from her milk-processing, this can be invested in 
cattle. And this cattle, like the provision made in respect of her 
daughters, will not be in the title of men. But it will be hers to 
use, and vested in the title of her daughters and their children.
Given that Hamidy had a large number of daughters, and consequently 
has been accumulating provision for them over some period of time, 
and has been using the cash surplus of milk products to invest in 
further cattle, it is not surprising to find that her wealth has 
accumulated to such an extent.
That it should however come to be the basis to a household, 
and moreover be the single largest amount in one camp, is the result 
of further factors which are beyond her own control. There was a
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shortage of cattle in the surra of 'lyal Ganis at that time 
(Cunnison:l:79)* And this had led to a clustering around those 
who had larger amounts. To a great extent, the economic supremacy 
of Hurgas, the leader of the main camp, and the number of his
dependants was the result of this depletion of the herds. This had
caused the differential between his property and that of others to be 
increased. He had become the single biggest owner in either camp.
The only persons who could challenge his dominance within the surra
were those who also had some large amount of cattle. The split in
the two camps had come with a dispute between Hurgas and Hamdan, 
the brother of Hamidy, over the question of the marriage of one of 
the women of the surra (Cunnison:li77)* Hamdan, in the course of 
the dispute, moved from the main camp and refused to participate in 
camp extension of hospitality. But lacking property himself, he 
could only do this on the basis of the property of his sister,
Hamidy. In fact, were further details available about this incident, 
it would be interesting to explore the probability that a woman 
such as Hamidy, was not merely a passive pawn in the discussions, 
but in fact an instigator of the precipitating events. Given the 
frequent absence of Hamdan, his involvement in the events leading up 
to the split cannot have been as great as that of his sister. And it 
is quite likely that Hamidy called on Hamdan to act as her male 
spokesman in a matter which concerned her most nearly.
It would be mistaken to interpret this household as an 
instance of a woman1 s effective challenge to male dominance. Those 
women who achieve some significant autonomy are only those matrons
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who are separate from their marital kin; and of these women only 
very few can hope to achieve the prominence of Hamidy, or of 
Ghubeysha, the sister of Hurgas (see Cunnison:li52-3)• The limita­
tions on women1 s economic autonomy are strict. They are dependent 
first of all on marital and then maternal status, for it is in the 
second capacity that they receive provision for their children, even 
when removed from their marital homes* Even though this retention of 
material claims can lead to the enrichment of aAwoman when she is 
receiving provision from another man, the likelihood is small, for few 
women can guarantee being members of a few rich households among the 
Humr camps. It is true that, by comparison with the Kababish women, 
the Humr women have a range of autonomy within the household provision, 
and a sphere of economic action where men cannot exert close control*
And this enables them regularly to handle cash and to invest the 
surplus. But the amount of investment that is possible for them is 
strictly limited. They cannot hope through generous household provision 
alone to compete with the wealth of men.
The significance of the instance of Hamidy lies elsewhere, 
namely in the contrast that the status of the Humr matron has with that 
of the Kababish matron* By the time she has .arrived at the stage of 
matronhood, a Humr woman is of undoubted public significance. She 
is at the centre of a network of links with men, that in some cases 
has become extremely complex* The clearest indication of the 
complexity of this network is to find that a woman is receiving 
provision from several men at once* And this can only happen where
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she has moved from her marital home, taking with her the continuing 
interests of affinal kin in her children, particularly her daughters. 
By comparison, the Kababish woman does not and cannot develop a 
complex set of links with men, ?or those claims that she establishes 
in one area lapse if she moves to another, Kababish women remain 
tied to the one man presently acting as provider, some Humr 
women can free themselves of the control of any one man.
Chapter Three
Section A* The Personal Networks of Men and of Women
In her consideration of the relation between conjugal 
roles and social networks, Elizabeth Bott formulated a hypothesis 
that can be summarised in the following terms. "The degree of 
segregation of conjugal roles is related to the degree of connected­
ness in the total network of the family. Those families that had a 
high degree of segregation in the role-relationship of husband and 
wife had a close-knit network; many of their friends., neighbours 
and relatives knew one another. Families that had a relatively 
joint role-relationship between husband and wife had a loose-knit 
network; few of their relatives, neighbours and friends knew one 
another”. The hypothesis came to be drawn out on the basis of her 
data ass 11 The degree of segregation in the role-relationship of 
husband and wife varies directly with the connectedness of the 
family*s social network” (Bott:1971*59-60). For where both spouses 
continue to be drawn into activities with people outside their own 
elementary family^"rigid segregation of roles will be possible 
because each spouse can get help from people outside” (idem) and 
not have to rely on the other.
In order to explain the high value placed on the segregation 
of conjugal roles, and on the strict sexual division of labour and 
other activities that prevails among many non-industrial societies, 
G-luckman expanded this point further. He stated that ”wa could
4.
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assume that families in all tribal societies were the centre of 
close-knit networks; they live surrounded by the kin of both spouses 
and these kin were therefore neighbours, friends and workmates . . * . 
The close-knit network of nearby kin who also participate together 
in economic activities produces both segregation into mono-sex groups 
and in conjugal roles . . . .  and the tighter the fit between these 
variables, the more likely it is that segregation of roles will be 
not merely the habits of individual couples, but contain a high degree 
of convention passing into ceremonial and even ritual practices and 
occult beliefs*' (G-luckman: Preface to Bott 1971 editionixviii and xxii).
At first sight it would appear that these two societies 
share that feature. For the families which comprise the households 
of the camping units are resident with kin, and in the division of 
tasks in the economy, there is a clear division of labour on grounds 
of sex*
However it is already clear that such a generalisation 
would be misleading. For the camps of the Humr are "associated with 
a lineage of a kind known as a 'surra1 . . . .  the ideal camping, 
migrating and cattle-herding unit, as well as the limit of intimate 
and undifferentiated brotherhood" (Gunnison:1:59)* And, despite the 
lack of such a high degree of concentration of agnatic kin as is true 
of the Bedouin camps, for example, the camps of the Humr are focussed 
on a core of agnatic kin, which gives each of the camps a corporate 
identity. The camps of the commoner Kababish are divided into 
clusters of associated households, none of which "corresponded to 
permanent structural units; they were neither stable nor organised
as wholes . . . .  it is always multiple individual links and 
not membership of a group that creates a camping cluster" (Asad:
129 and 131)* Even more significantly the contrast between the 
residential units of the two societies can be made with reference 
to economic cooperation. Whereas the Humr camps share respon­
sibility for the herding of animals, and therefore avoid the 
possibility of an individual household suffering an acute shortage 
of labour, the Kababish households must each manage their own 
resources separately. Herding partnerships are made on a primarily 
contractual basis, implying no further solidarity, and almost all 
households face at some time an acute problem in the allocation of 
labour.
This is an important factor in itself, for as Gluckman has 
pointed out, "the. close-knit network of nearby kin who also participate 
together in economic activities, produces both segregation into mono­
sex groups and in conjugal roles" (see above). And it would seem 
that this has an important bearing on the problem that is raised, 
namely why the Kababish men are prepared to compromise on the sexual 
division of labour. This compromise is divisible into two aspects, 
within the domestic domain it would seem to indicate more "joint" 
conjugal roles. Outside the domestic domain it indicates a break­
down in the mono-sex groupings in economic activities. Seemingly 
this compromise over the sexual division of labour is related to the 
more "loose-knit" networks of the Kababish families, where co-resident 
kin are not economically cooperating.
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The Humr are jointly responsible within a camp for the 
herding of the animals. And this permits men to leave the camp, as 
and when necessary in the assurance that their animals will still be 
cared for properly. It also ensures that a man who has insufficient 
labour to meet demands in his own household can call on the services 
of others in the camp, for his animals will continue to form part of a 
herding unit (Cunnison:l:67). A Kababish man who leaves his animals 
behind has problems, even when he hires a herder5 -for, as the case 
of Salim, a trader in the Abu Sufyan damar, indicates animals can be 
left unattended both by herder and family. His herder went off to 
attend a wedding nearby, and his male kin were reluctant to intervene 
(Asad:33). In the altercations exchanged about who was responsible 
for this neglect, the women of Salim's household were involved, being 
accused of dereliction of their duties.
But again this is insufficient in itself, for another 
question must be answered. There is compromise about the involvement 
of women in male tasks, but there is no compromise about men helping 
the women in their tasks. (\s Asad has clearly stated, "women are
frequently called upon to perform men's tasks, but rarely if ever the 
other way around. Women are therefore more likely in general to be 
overworked than men" (Asad:47). Hot only do the men come to rely on 
the labour of their own women in their sphere of tasks, they also 
rely on the support of other women. /As I shall show, women must
always have the support of other women at times of crisis; and where 
they could not share some of the burden of their tasks with other 
women, they would not be free to work with the men. The mono-sex 
grouping of the women in their tasks remain intact.
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So it became clear to me as I considered these problems, 
that some modification of the original hypothesis of Bott was 
necessary, for her analysis rested on the point that the relative 
"jointness" or "segregation11 of conjugal roles was connected with 
the relative density of a familyfs network. Where this network was 
close-knit, conjugal roles were segregated, where this network was 
loose-knit, conjugal roles tended to be more joint, with shared 
activity between husband and wife, and a breakdown of the monor-sex 
grouping in leisure and recreation (Bott:1955A956,1957 and 1971)*
By using her concepts I could advance no further than already 
outlined* Some more exact measure of the components of the social 
networks of families was required. In this modification I was greatly 
helped by reading the forthcoming article of Bruce Kapferer, where 
he emphasised the point that the d ensity of familial networks bears
3 /
little relation to the jointness or segretation of conjugal
t
roles. He found that it was more important to consider separately 
the individual networks of the spouses, and the manner in which their 
separate networks were interlinked.
Mitchell in 1969 pointed out that some clarification in 
the terminology accumulating round the concept of "network" was 
necessary. And he suggested that a starting point should be agreement 
that "the point of anchorage of a network is usually taken to be some 
specified individual whose behaviour the observer wishes to observe" 
(13) and again "the point of view taken in these essays is that 
a network is most conveniently anchored on an individual" (15)* So 
that the network, now called personal network or ego-centred network,
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is focussed on the lowest level of abstraction possible, namely 
the individual. And he farther argued that it was necessary for 
a network to be defined in this way if further refinements were 
to be made.
This was the very point taken up by ICapfarer in his 
forthcoming article, for, as he stated, once the focal point of 
a network becomes not a couple, but an individual, it is possible 
to identify a number of structural aspects of those networks. In 
his own analysis, he found five to be relevant, and I mention them 
all so as to explain why some I have used, and others I have had to 
discard in this analysis. I am aware that this is an unusual 
exercise in which I am indulging. I am using concepts framed for 
intensive study of extremely d etailed material, when I have very 
limited data to hand. But, by using certain of his concepts, the 
answer to my problem began to appear.
He first reduced the density of a network to manageable 
proportions by limiting it to "the number of actual relationships 
between the individuals in ego's network, excluding ego's own 
direct relationships to these individuals, over the number of 
possible relationships". He then pointed out that the span of 
a network related to the number of individuals with whom ego has 
a relationship. No precise measure of span is possible as "in the 
context of this argument it is relative". Three types of zones, 
intimate, effective and extended, could be distinguished. Theifirst 
two being marked-out primarily by the content of relationship with 
ego. Within the intimate zone relationships "tend to be instrumental
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in content and many-stranded"; in the extended zone "individuals 
are linked to ego by an interactional relationship which is more 
associated in content". And the extended zone he refers to as 
"that set of individuals whom ego personally knows, but with whom 
he has not established any regular interactional relationship". 
Within the network there may or may not be a tendency for individuals 
to be clustered into independent cliques, an aspect of network that 
is referred to as the degree of clustering. Closely related
to this aspect is the degree of cross-linkage; within an egocentric 
network this refers to "the number of interactional relationships 
out of the total possible linking the members of the separate 
clusters within the network". But as between separate egocentric 
networks it refers to the different types of cross-linkage that 
are possible; star cross-linkage referring to the extent to 
which the two egos are directly linked to the same individuals in 
each other's networks, and zone cross-linkage to the extent to 
which individuals in the network of one are connected to the 
individuals in the network of the other (Kapfereri17-18).
The proposal that he made was "that joint or complementary 
role relationships are most likely to be found where a) there is 
high density in the separate networks of husband and wife; b) 
there is a low degree of clusterability within each of the 
separate husband and wife networks; c) there is a high degree 
of star cross-linkage between networks, in the sense that both 
husband and wife are directly linked by social relationships to
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the same individuals? and d) there is a high degree of zone 
cross-linkage between the networks? in the sense that the 
individuals located in the various zones of the respective 
networks are directly linked by social relationships to each 
other” (22-23)* Most importantly for my purposes? ”it is 
stressed that the likelihood of joint of complementary conjugal 
role relationships being present is increased where the cross- 
linkage involves relationships which constitute high investments? 
where the cross-linkage occurs predominantly between the intimate 
zones of the husband and wife networks and where these relation­
ships involve individuals who are key to the set of relationships 
of the respective spouses. Conversely? segregation in the 
conjugal role relationship? for example? is most likely to occur 
where the separate networks of the husbands and wives have a high 
degree of clusterability and consist of few or no relationships 
cross-linking the separate networks”. (23)
Within this formulation? it is clear that certain 
aspects cannot be tested by the material that I have available:
I do not have the detailed information that he was able to 
gather about individual networks. I cannot measure density except 
in very general terms? but I do have some information about 
the span of networks. My information agrees with that of 
Kapferer, where he noted that the spans of the networks of 
the women were restricted as compared with those of the men 
(19). For? as earlier suggested? the restriction of women
to their maternal and marital roles? serves to limit the 
number of relationships that they can establish. Of the zones 
to which he refers? I am able to make some assessment of the 
crucial intimate zone? within which are located the most 
important of the links that a person has with others. Moreover, 
although I cannot assess adequately the degree of clustering 
between persons? I can indicate the degree of cross-linkage 
between networks. Particularly? I can assess to what extent 
there is cross-linkage between the intimate zones of separate 
networks.
The way in which I can achieve this assessment? is by 
analysing in terms of those mono-sex groupings of people that 
are mobilised at times of crisis. For both men and women are 
subject to crises with which they cannot cope alone and which 
may be seen as times of stress (Boswell:196 9 :256). Those 
people to whom they turn in times of crisis I consider to be 
grouped around ego as a ,!support network”. Where this
support network is located within the intimate zone of a 
person's network? then the frequent mobilisation of such persons 
can be an important aspect of solidarity developing.
The crises that strike in the sphere of male tasks are 
different in nature and rhythm from those of the women's sphere. 
They are primarily concerned with the availability of resources 
adequate to supply a household? and come to focus on two main 
aspects? availability of animals and of labour. Where the head
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of a household faces a shortage of animals? through factors 
beyond his control? some means to adjust this shortage must
be found. The Humr avoid this possibility as far as possible? 
by the insistence on the egalitarian principle that fortunes 
should be equalised in inheritance. In the allocations listed 
by Gunnison in Appendix 2? men frequently shared out the portions? 
and where some were clearly richer than others? they were excluded 
in favour of others. But there was a shortage of animals in the 
surra at the time? and in any case Inheritance played a small 
part in the total distribution of animals (see page (( ). More 
importantly? Gunnison indicates that an aspect of agnatic 
solidarity was for loans of animals to be made to poorer kin 
and for men with few cattle to cluster around those with many 
(Cunnison:l:79). Of those poorer men who had clustered around 
richer kin? a form of dependence with the wealthier man had 
developed for ”a man who has given or loaned a cow attaches the 
recipient to him in perpetuity” (Gunnison:1:80). The only 
alternative for poorer men was to leave and work in the towns 
for wages and to build up their herds that way, s© that? of the 
men who mobilised support in the crisis of cattle shortage? all 
who remained in the camps became recruited to the personal 
network of a richer mah.
By comparison? the Kababish seem not only to avoid such 
dependence developing as a result of poverty? but also to avoid 
the opportunity to aid when wealthy. Various arrangements are 
possible for a man who is short of animals: he can work as hired
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herder to a richer household, and receive payment of the smaller 
animals that he can build up into his own herd, or he can hire 
himself out for odd jobs at the walls, etc. (Asad:53). But in 
neither case do the arrangements imply any further dependence.
Even those men working as regular herders can leave after a few 
years, and the relationship is primarily contractual, an exchange 
of services for payments in kind, there is no binding obligation 
for richer kin to assist their poorer relatives. For example Hamid 
(see Asad:152) was able to neglect the interests of his own 
brother while trying to stress his solidarity with his richer 
agnates, Salim and Abdurrahman. In each case, the arrangements 
made for aid in time of shortage of animals were the result of 
individual contractual arrangements and not indicative of any 
greater solidarity.
Even when, as is true of many Kababish households, the 
problem of labour allocation arose, the different arrangements 
that were made implied no permanent dependence, ’Most households 
find it difficult if not impossible to muster enough hands from 
within to care for the animals on which they subsist. These do 
not include families which possess enough animals to enable them 
to hire regular herders who then become members of the household. 
But such households are comparatively few in number: out of my
census sample of 130 households only 15 had hired herders”
(Asad: 122). Of the remaining households at least 42 were unable 
to stretch their resources to meet labour demands, and they were
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consequently dependent on extra-household labour. In only one 
type of herding arrangement, where two or more households herded 
all their main varieties of animals jointly, was there an impli­
cation of extra-household solidarity. And this was the least 
common arrangement, most men preferring to herd only one main 
variety of animal jointly, and thus minimise the involvement with 
another household. (Asad:124-5). Herding partnerships are 
frequently the source of mutual recrimination, and changes in 
partnerships occur often.
As previously indicated, such problems of labour 
allocation do not arise for the Humr. As long as the basic 
requirement of household composition is met, that a man should 
have animals, and be living in the tent of a woman who provides 
domestic services, and takes care of the milking and processing 
of milk products, the joint responsibility of the camp for the 
herding reduces any chance of his having to recruit extra help*
In addition, any man who is wealthy immediately attracts 
dependents to him, who can either reside attached to the household 
of a woman that he is maintaining, or can live nearby so as to 
share in the camp hospitality, and attract assistance when 
required.'
This has important implications in terms of the 
structural aspects of the personal networks of the men of the 
two societies. For by Kapferer*s definition, the intimate aone 
of a network is characterised by relationships that are 
instrumental in content and many-stranded, and it would therefore
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seam. that the Kababish men are seeking to avoid any extension 
of this intimate aone. In order not to compromise household 
autonomy, they seek relationships that are primarily contractual;, 
and not instrumental in content, and attach to their households 
men with whom they do not have close and multiplex links of an 
enduring nature. By contrast the wealthy Humr man attaches to 
his household dependants with whom he has multiplex links of 
common agnation and kinship. The content of their relationship 
does not remain with the economic inbalance, but develops into 
a further solidarity which focuses the households comprising a 
camp around the households of the richer men.
The Humr men do not seek to avoid the implications of 
support in their economic strategy, for it serves the interests 
both of the rich and of the poor. Within the main camp of the 
surra of »Iyal Granis, the poorer men such as Abu Dik, had attached 
themselves to the richer households and ensured maintenance for 
themselves (Cunnisonsi:53 and 79)• And the only limitation to 
such support was the overall shortage of cattle within the surra, 
which had caused some men to leave for wage labour in the 
neighbouring market centres. This shortage had reduced to an 
extent the ability of a man such as Hurgas, the leader of the 
main camp^to attach to himself even more dependents. But it 
had increased the differential between his own wealth and that 
of others^ So that he was the undoubted leader of the camp and 
surra, and at the focal point of the network that was the single
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largest in span and which bound most people to him. For men 
such as Abu Dik, who were dependent on him for economic support, 
this amounted to cutting across other ties within their intimate 
zone. He, for example, was unable to openly express his sympathies 
with Hamdan, his father’s brother, in the camp dispute (see 
Cunnison:lJ79) and maintained a more neutral position.
Within the Kababish camps, economic differentiation leads 
to a minimal clustering around individuals. Each man, whether 
rich or poor, is concerned to maintain household autonomy, for 
that is the mainspring of his authority. Political office among 
the Kababish is the prerogative of an elite, the Awlad Fadlallah 
lineage and the purposes to which an accumulation of dependants 
could be turned are very limited (Asad:237). The political 
advantage of a richer man gaining permanent support from those 
men he aided was minimal, and households remain at the centre of 
multiple individual links rather than being drawn into the 
expanding span of a richer man’s network. Moreover, it is in 
the strategic interests of all men to reduce their intimate zone 
to a minimum, refusing even the claims of a poorer brother, such 
as Hamid had done (see earlier).
This choice that the Kababish men have in avoiding 
multiplex relationships and choosing rather to establish diverse 
individual links, comes through the different resources that they 
have at their command. Each man is pursuing an economic strategy 
in which his resources of animals and/or labour are bargaining 
counters. It is therefore possible for them to establish relations
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of a primarily contractual nature, based on the exchange of one 
for the other. And it is also possible for such relations to be 
terminated, as these resources can be sought elsewhere* In this 
they contrast with the Humr men who bargain with wealth and 
political support, and they contrast with the women of both 
societies.
The women are involved not in creating relationships 
of an associational, or contractual nature, but in investing in 
relations of a high degree of trust and involvement that are 
instrumental in content. The support that they recruit from 
other women is in relation to tasks that require frequent 
mobilisation of a support network, and a highly emotive content. 
They are constantly involved in coping with the life-crises of 
birth, sickness and death which involve not only extra work but 
also a high degree of stress. The crises which arise in the 
sphere of women’s work seem therefore to be an amalgam of the 
two definitions that Boswell outlined in 1969. The first 
definition relates to ’’situations seen by the participants as 
ones of great stress, usually with which they cannot cope alone" 
and secondly as ’’situations defined as potentially critical by 
observers, which one set of participants may be able to deal with 
on their own but which will require extra-familial assistance for 
others". He was particularly concerned with the "periodic but 
normal situations where an individual or family is thrown into 
dependency on others by the nature of events" and this he relates 
to the second definition (Boswell:1969s256). The crises in the
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women1 s sphere of responsibility are "normal" and "periodic" 
involving as they do frequently occurring events, but they are 
also seen as "ones of great stress" where emotional support is 
recruited. And both the individual women and their families "are 
thrown into dependency on others" by the fact that women cannot 
cope alone, and cannot, for the most part, recruit sufficient 
support from within their households.
The focal point of a woman’s support network would be 
her mother if that remained possible^ -for as previously indicated, 
it is the mother with whom a daughter has shared all her experiences 
till the time of her marriage, and with whom she shares the trust.
In the early stages of marriage, it is clear that girls are not 
anxious to be removed too far from their mothers (Gunnison:2:295 
Asad:63). And in some cases the pressures that the women exert 
to remain near each other can be decisive in the location of the 
marital home (see Abdallah; Asad:97). But in all cases the women 
seek to maintain some continuity in the composition of the support 
network that she can mobilise. Those women most suited to fulfill 
the supportive roles in times of sickness and childbirth will be 
those female kin that she has known longest and with whom she has 
established long-term.relationships. The span of such female kin 
will be dependent on the continuity of the residential units and 
on the continuing presence of female kin within. And in the case 
of the Awlad Fadlallah camp of the Nurab clan of the Kababish, 
and also the camps of the Humr, endogamous marriages within the
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co-residential unit serve to retain the women within. It is 
possible for these women to retain continuity in their support 
networks•
Even where women are moved in marriage from their natal 
camp, they seek to keep these links operative, and visiting 
between a mother and her daughter can be frequent. Moreover, 
at certain times of the year, the women can be brought closer 
together in the congregation round the larger damars (Asadi22) 
concentration of the Humr tribe in the rains and harvest 
(bunnison:l:25)* In the more predictable events, such as that 
of childbirth, arrangements can be made for the mother to be 
present. However, the removal of a bride from her natal camp 
ultimately involves not merely an extension of the span of her 
support network, but also significant changes in its composition. 
The nature of their tasks, and the everyday aid that they 
frequently require is such that the retention of links with their 
natal camps is insufficient. From the time of her marriage and 
her new responsibility in her own domain, the likelihood of 
crisis occurring, which she cannot meet herself unaided, cannot 
be ignored. Such likelihood increases with her first pregnancy, 
multiplies with the increasing number of her children, and the 
consequent rise in work-load as she nurses her younger children, 
watches the older, and must still carry out the full range of 
her domestic tasks, such as cooking and milking and collection 
of firewood et. al.
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This forces on women a short-term philosophy of crisis 
which is best coped with by investing in relations with neighbouring 
women. They can be useful in such simple ways as "parking” 
the children for a short time (^AsadJ^l)* and are present in any 
major crisis suddenly occurring. Where tents of separate house­
holds are not linked in other ways, such as by the economic 
cooperation between the men, or by common membership of an extended 
family or lineage, then the links established by women stand out 
in clear contrast. In the camps of the commoner Kababish, all 
neighbouring tents are linked through the daily interaction of 
the women. They exchange gossip and small services, such as 
the loan of a child to help in some tasks, or in the lending of 
sugar or tea. These exchanges are by no means desultory, but 
are clearly for mutual convenience and to some purpose. Where 
residential units have no enduring structural entity, and men 
do not rely 011 each other for mutual aid, the women of the 
households can be called upon to aid the men. In order to cope 
with these extra demands on top of their already heavy work-load, 
women must have the aid of other women in reducing their work-load 
to some extent. This investment in relations with neighbouring 
women is not merely a short-term strategy, but by being related 
to the major crises that might occur, involves the creation of 
a high degree of trust and mutual concern between the women.
For the major crises that strike are situations of great stress, 
where emotional support is required, and where the presence of 
women of shared experiences is of great comfort. This is not
to state in any way that the men's lack of involvement with the 
actual work of these crises excludes their emotional involvement.
But it does stress again that one aspect of sexual segregation 
is to divide the sexes into mono-groupings mobilised at times of 
crisis. The women share their emotional strain with other 
women.
So the relationships established with neighbouring women 
are not merely interactional and associational, but are instrumental. 
They lead to creation of trust and of mutual dependence on each 
other. The women are bound together by their common interests, 
and each woman is concerned to maintain or extend the intimate 
25one of her personal network that is primarily composed of those 
women of her support network.
This solidarity between neighbouring women serves to 
increase the corporate interests of a camp where men are economically 
cooperating. And this increases the chances that women can them­
selves have some corporate expression of interests, where an 
occasion is provided. This is true of the Humr matrons, who on 
the occasion of a marriage have a chance to express their joint 
interests, and can influence the course of events (see next section). 
But where men are not economically cooperating, then the solidarity 
of women in different tents can become a deciding factor in the 
spatial organisation of a camp. In the camps of the Kababish, 
close relationship and friendship "especially between the wives 
of individual households, are often important in encouraging
a measure of spatial proximity" (Asad:28). And in the diagrams 
that he drew of the camping clusters of separate tents, there 
was in at least one case a striking preponderance of links 
between households being through women and not men (Asad:130: 
cluster three). ?j/here men lack interests in establishing 
households close to each other, and where they utilise a diverse 
range of individual links in their economic strategy, it is not 
surprising that the close and enduring links established between 
women should come to play an important role in the organisation 
of camp life.
This role of the links between women is linked to the 
seeming compromise by the men over division of labour. For it 
implies that whereas women always have an intimate zone to their 
personal networks which can influence their choice of residence, 
the part played by the intimate zone in men's decisions is not so 
crucial. Moreover, there is some implication that the men by 
using the women in male tasks try to avoid dependence on other 
men, and to make use of the assistance that their wife can gain 
from other women.
Now, as Kapferer has pointed out, the crucial factor in 
predicting that joint or complementary conjugal role relationships 
m i l  occur, is that "cross-linkage occurs predominantly between 
the intimate zones of the husband and wife networks and where 
these relationships involve individuals that are key to the set 
of relationships of the respective spouses" (op. cit.:23). The
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Humr men and the Humr women both have intimate zones to their 
networks in which are located their key supportive relationships, 
and the possibility of such cross-linkage therefore exists for 
individual spouses. The Kababish women also have this important 
intimate zone in their personal networks, but the chances that 
there vail be cross-linkage between that zone and the corresponding 
one in their husbands' is reduced. For most men seek to avoid 
the dependence that is implied by creating supportive relationships 
within this zone. And it would seem therefore that the original 
phrasing of my problem has gone askew, for the relative jointness 
of the Kababish conjugal roles that is seemingly implied in the 
compromise over sexual division of labour cannot be related to 
such cross-linkage between intimate zones.
There are two possibilities of finding an answer. First 
that the hypothesis, as Kapferer outlined it, cannot be applied.
The second that the compromise over sexual division of labour is 
not, in fact, related to relative "jointness" in conjugal roles, 
but to some other aspect. In order to unravel this disorder, I 
test first the hypothesis of Kapferer with what data I can muster. 
There are two instances of marriages given by Gunnison and Asad, 
where the intimate zone of the wife's network involves key 
relationships for the husband* They are the marriages of Abu Bik 
to Hurgas1 daughter, Rabha (Cunnisonsl:53-56, 79) and of Abdallah 
to the daughter of Hamid (Asad:95-98)* And in both cases the 
husbands were resident in the natal camp of the woman.
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These marriages were each serving double strategies.
The husbands were gaining economic support from the fathers- 
in law, and in exchange the fathers-in-law were gaining the 
services of the husbands. In the case of Abu Dik, the relation 
between Hurgas and his son-in-law Abu Dik was clearly imbalanced 
For, whereas the marriage and its continuance was crucial to 
Abu Dik, and also to his brother, for Hurgas, it was of some 
importance, in ensuring political support from Abu Dik, but not 
critical. Abu Dik had been able to marry Rabha "only through 
his elder brother Adim's abnegation. Adim had married twice 
and divorced twice after he saw that his wives were not bearing 
him children. He then devoted all his wealth to obtaining a 
wife for his young brother in the hope that he would be more 
successful, which he was. Now Adim lived on Abu Dik's household 
contributing to it" (Gunnison:1:53-5). Rabha was mediating a 
link between men that was crucial to the economic strategy of 
not only Abu Dik, her husband, who could rely on his richer 
affines in time of great hardship, but also of Adim, who had 
sunk his wealth in this investment. In return, Hurgas, her 
father, as mentioned earlier, gained the political support of 
the two men. f^ t the time of the camp dispute, they tried
to maintain a neutral stand and avoid jeopardising their 
relations with Hurgas, who opposed their father's brother 
Hamdan.
The attachment of Abdallah to his father-in-law's 
household could not serve any political strategy for Hamid,
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for commoner Kababish men are essentially limited to domestic 
authority and denied political activity (Asad:l), But the 
presence of the younger man did help to ease the usual problem 
about labour available. Abdallah1s stated intention was to herd 
Hamid’s sheep along with his own and he wanted to remove all his 
animals from the herd of his father. His father was indignant 
at the loss both of the sheep, and also at the idea of Abdallah 
offering his services free to his father-in-law, while refusing 
them to him. Abdallah removed to the camp of his bride and 
worked with his father-in-law. But the continuance of these 
arrangements was dependent on the continuance of the marriage.
As long as the economic strategy of the two men continued best 
served by this arrangement, then the marriage and the residence 
in the bride’s camp would continue.
Clearly the fathers of brides come into the intimate zone
of their personal network. And where the groom is soliciting
particular support from his father-in-law, then he must pay
attention not only to his relationship with the older man, but
also to the women mediating this relationship. Now, whereas it
is unlikely that strategic marriages such as this will reduce ^
u - .............  - - -  v
the ’’segregation in work division between the spouses, it may
well increase the ’’jointness1’ of conjugal roles in other ways.
For where a marriage with strategic investment such as this
exists, the women have gains which they make in relationships
that they can manipulate. Rabha and the bride of Abdallah had
a double advantage - they were able to enforce their claims and
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to influence decisions through playing father against husband, 
and they had the continuing support, if not of their mothers, 
then of the female kin with whom they had been most closely 
associated.
X cover this aspect more closely in the next section,
for it relates to what potential women can gain for power. But
what is now clear is that marriages such as these may well 
encourage more jointness in decision-making, but they also 
encourage a continuing sexual division of labour. Both the
women and the men have around them the beginnings of the mono­
sex grouping which will aid them in their different tasks. 
Particularly this is relevant to the Kababish man Abdallah; 
he has the advantage over many other Kababish in that he can 
count at least on the assistance of his father-in-law, in return 
for his taking on the care of his animals.
If, in the consideration of performance of conjugal 
roles, one divides the analysis into two major aspects, the 
possibility of shared activity, and of shared decision-making,
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then the solution to my problem emerges. For, while the 
Kababish men’s lack of effective support network among their 
co-resident male kin leads to their sharing males’ tasks with 
married women, it does not necessarily lead to these women 
having a larger share in decisions that are taken. The 
Kababish women lack the second essential in having effective 
influence - the possibility of manipulating men against 
each other. The use that men make of women, and of the fact 
that the women’s support networks operate, amounts to a form 
of subsidy in the men’s work, and does not alter the balance of 
power within any given household.
If, however, it could be shown that a woman could 
mobilise certain of the female linkages selected out of her 
total network, and operate a mono-sex grouping to confront the 
men, then the combination of women in a camp would increase her 
personal influence. It is to this aspect of network mobilisation 
that I now turn.
Section B: The Potential for Power Within the Networks of Women
As already demonstrated, it is clear that married 
women cannot survive and carry out the full range of their 
tasks without the assistance at times of other women. Where 
no specialised agencies' exist, the only resource of a married 
woman facing a" crisis is to call on other women; and among 
the total number of women in her network, some will clearly 
be more suited than others to assist her. Primarily, a woman 
will seek, at least in the early stages of her marriage, to 
retain effective links with her mother and female natal kin, 
but because of the nature and recurrence of the crises that 
arise, she will have to turn to the women who are neighbours, 
in the same camp. This in itself serves to incorporate 
incoming women into camp life, not merely in the crisis 
situations, but in the pattern of visiting, small loans and 
everyday aid that is established between women of neighbouring 
tents. So that within the camp as a residential unit, the 
links between the women of the different tents create a 
pattern of cooperation. This is by contrast with the way in 
which the Kababish men avoid cooperation, and no prediction 
can be made about neighbouring men combining in herding tasks, 
whereas the cooperation between the Humr women further compounds 
the corporate life of a camp where men are already linked by 
common agnation and economic cooperation.
Not all women move on marriage to another camp, and 
then they have the advantage of remaining with their female 
agnates. This is possible either-'through endogamous marriage, 
where a girl Is married to an agnate who is also co-resident 
or through the husband choosing to live in the same camp as 
his bride’s family. Despite the strains of a mother continuing 
to try and exert her authority over her daughter, the young 
woman has the advantage of the continued presence of female 
kin that she has known well and in whom she can place trust.
And the solidarity of camp life is further encouraged where 
the links between co-resident women are so complex.
But even those women who remove on marriage from 
their natal camps do not lose all effective ties and communi­
cation with their female agnates. The pattern of annual 
movement is such that the camps concentrate at certain times 
of the year, and kin separated throughout the year move closer 
together. And mention has already been made of how visiting 
between close female kin in different camps is observed 
particularly in the early stages of marriage (see page %ip ).
Across the separate camping units spread the links between 
women in addition to those between men. it is notable
with the Humr, women are free to leave the camps and to 
maintain contact with other women in the markets, visiting 
of families, and the ceremonies which they attend (Gunnison:1:63).
It is this second aspect of the networks of women 
that raises in my mind the possibility that some further
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solidarity and group consciousness has developed among the 
Humr women. For, as Nancy Tapper stated in her thesis 
(Tapper:1968) it is possible for women in nomadic pastoral 
society to ’’take part in two definite spheres of social 
activity. One is based on camps, discrete localised groups 
of households; the other is a system of ego-centred circles 
or dyadic relations, mobilised at feasts and cutting across 
the localised camps. Separate camp communities of women do 
not build up into a larger structure, nor do the ego-centred 
circles form a structure larger than a society-vjide network 
of such circles. However, in both camp activities and feasts 
women are enabled to maintain and manipulate ascribed and 
achieved statuses so that similar ranking systems based on a 
common system of values are found among all Shahsavan women; 
these systems form a structure and the women of the Shahsavan 
form a society or culture of their own” (op. cit.:12-13). The 
necessary conditions for the development of such a ’’sub-society” 
were threefold: First, some degree of separation of women’s
activities from men's. Among the Shahsavan it would seem that 
this is due to the sexual cum ceremonial segregation which 
characterises all social activity. Second, an opportunity 
for interaction among the women - with the fairly large 
camping units, and women were free to travel, sometimes alone, 
considerable distances to attend feast gatherings. And third, 
a medium of interaction, which were the dyadic ties of the 
”xeir-u-sarr” (’’All those people to whose feasts 1 go and who
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come to my feasts11) with their implicit reciprocity and 
obligations of mutual attendance at feasts (op, cit.:144=).
Within this sub-society, women were ranked according 
to their ascribed statuses of birth, age, marital and domestic 
statuses, but could become "leaders11, i.e. with powerful 
positionsin womenTs sub-society and significant influence in 
the male sphere, through achieving certain statuses which 
then gave the woman a public role in life. Typically a leader 
"arrives at her leadership position after going to Mashhad as 
a pilgrim or having established herself as a ceremonial cook 
(idem:78). But the crucial point in either the development of 
this sub-society, or the ranking within it, is the medium of 
interaction; for "it is the institution of, xeir-Ur-sarr which 
allows for the development and expression of women’s' relations 
with other women thus forming a sub-society. In this the 
leaders arise and their influence can be extended through 
xelr-u-sarr to distant women who are otherwise unconnected" 
(91-2). Relations between women are defined and redefined at 
the feasts which the women travel to attend. And Tapper goes 
on to state that it is possible to identify a "medium of 
interaction" for women in other social situations, such as, 
she suggests, the songs of the Humr women.
Before I go on to investigate this suggestion, and 
the implications that it has for women’s chances for power, 
there are several strictures that must be made in advance. 
Within the residential units of the camps, the position of the
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Humr women as compared with the Shahsavan women is clearly 
different# With certain expect ions, such as between the 
wives of employed and employee, the Shahsavan have no general 
pattern of cooperation between the women of different tents 
(Tappers60); whereas it is an important aspect of any Humr 
woman's experience that she will be cooperating with other 
women in the camp* Where obligations for camp hospitality are 
such as previously indicated (see page 6 0 ), it is impossible 
for the women to remain isolated within their tents, and it is 
in their own interests to share tasks, and help out on everyday 
loans, etc. This suggests that the extension of women's 
relations within the camp across camp boundaries may well be 
of a different form from that of the Shahsavan# For my purposes 
it may well be an extension of group solidarity amongst the 
women, rather than of the individual dyadic ties to which Tapper 
refers•
Secondly, any definition of which women among the Humr 
might most appropriately be called "leaders" must differ from 
that given for the Shahsavan# The very nature of Humr camp life 
and corporate responsibility is sucfr that women are at all times 
public figures, because they participate in politically important 
events, and express opinions to which men pay attention# In this 
way, the remarkable achievement of the Shahsavan woman who was 
able to move up with the men to their hillside discussion about 
migration (Tapper:85) and to participate more or less equally 
with the men in conversation and discussion would seem less
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r©markable• The context of Humr camp life is such that women 
cannot be excluded from participation in discussion, even if 
their involvement is indirect#
To clarify the points X refer again to the famous 
occasion when the Humr women forced the men to action, and then 
spread the story of what happened throughout Humrland# A group 
of Humr had gone on a giraffe expedition into Upper Nile Province 
and were caught by a party of police who deblared that they 
were poaching. The men invited the police to the camp so as to 
discuss the matter, and see what action should be taken# Once 
there, the men agreed to go to the District Commissioner, but 
the women who had been able to hear the whole conversation 
started shouting abuse at the men and telling them how ashamed 
they should be to be taken away by 1abid1 - slaves, referring 
to the Upper Nile police# This incensed the men, and fighting 
broke out in the course of which some of the police were killed# 
The episode did not end there with the intervention of 
the women, the rash action of the men and the killing of the 
policemen. First of all, the police sent in reinforcements 
who took away all the men concerned, except one who ran away.
And then, the story was spread by the women's songs throughout 
Humrland, and was still remembered seven years later# The 
songs sang to the praise of the brave men, and ruined the 
reputation of the coward who ran away. The men were vulnerable 
to the opinion of the women first through the presence of the 
women at the time of the event, and secondly through the fact
-111-
that the women’s values are so close to those of the men that 
they are vulnerable to the reputation that women spread. Women 
cannot be excluded from the public life of the men, for the 
whole arrangement of camp life is such that discussion and 
argument are clearly observed and overheard by the women, even 
though they are separated by the men being grouped around the 
tree and the women near their tents.
Secondly the men cannot control the spread of the 
songs. The women have opportunities for interaction within 
the camp, and in other camps. In the camps they sing around 
the fires, "then with the changing patterns of residence at 
all times of the year, the songs, if they are good, become 
spread around the whole tribe, the men’s reputations spreading 
with them. Men are affected by women singing from the time of 
their circumcision onwards: for.at the circumcision, the girls
A
surround him with the song: "If you cry, I won’t sing for you." 
Every little lapse during his life is likely to bring down a 
song on his head. At his wedding eve, older women surround him 
and sing songs about the brave exploits of his ancestors and 
older kinsmen; and thereafter if he has a reputation at all it 
is spread by the songs of the women singers (Gunnison:2 :31)* 
Given the emphasis of the men on their qualities of generosity, 
virility and wealth in cattle, to which the women sing, it is 
clear that the Humr women have a tremendous resource in the 
publicity they can bring to bear on the failings of a man.
It is in their own interests to insist on the "generosity" 
of a man, as I indicated in Chapter Two. For where a man is
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generous and wealthy, the women, resident with him cannot but 
benefit themselves (see page & J ),
A third point to mark, is how the different generations 
of women are involved on different occasions. Circumcision of a 
boy is the time for the young girls to sing . . . .  marriage is 
the time for the older women . . . .  the matrons. The "immense 
political influence" of which Cunnison speaks as the attribute 
of Humr women, is not an individual achievement as with some 
Shahsavan women, but is a corporate asset shared amongst the 
women of the camps and surras* However, certain occasions 
clearly belong to certain categories of women, and it is 
necessary to see whether the different occasions determine a 
differential patterning of influence, among the women.
Secondly, it is important, seeing that the corporate influence 
of women is broken down into marital categories, to investigate 
whether certain women have more of that asset than others within 
their same category* Is it possible in fact to speak of 
prominent women or of women leaders?
Tapper might argue that the Humr women do not in fact 
have a sub-society; for after all the very point that I am 
stressing, about the public life of the women and how the men 
cannot exclude them from discussions would seem to negate the 
first principle that she outlined that for a sub-society to 
form, there must be "some degree of separation of women's 
activities from men's", in addition to an opportunity for the 
women to interact, and a medium of interaction among themselves.
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This is insufficiently precise as a criterion to compare 
different social situations. In all societies there is "some 
degree of separation of women’s activities from men's". What 
should be identified is not the separation itself, but in what 
particular activities the separation is clearest, and has the 
greatest significance. For example, with the Shahsavan women, 
it is not merely the separation of women’s domestic activities 
from those of the men that is important, but also the 
separation of men from women at the ceremonial occasions that 
both attend, with men and women in separate tents, and the way 
in which men remove from women’s earshot when they have important 
matters to discuss (Tapper:85). With the Humr there is sexual 
differentiation in terms of domestic duties, and range of tasks; 
there is sexual division on ritual-ceremonial occasions, but 
the women cannot be excluded from discussion.
So, whereas the segregation of men from women on 
ceremonial occasions and at times of discussion serves to 
create a sub-society for the Shahsavan women, and to create 
an opportunity for some women to emerge as leaders through the 
prestige of being invited to most feasts (Tapper:82) and to 
break down the barriers of male participation by joining in 
discussion (idem:85), the same cannot be held for the Humr.
The division between men and women on ceremonial occasions 
does not amount to segregation. The women participate equally 
with the men, and in the sight and hearing of men. The two 
clearest instances of this are the time of circumcision, and 
the time of marriage taking place.
At the time of a boy's circumcision, the young 
unmarried girls surround him and sing; at a girl's circum­
cision, "the women of a camp join together to draw a line 
of ashes from the circumcision tent out from the camp to 
cross a path passing by it. . . . The women lie in wait and 
as any male crosses (the line), they pounce on him and demand 
money . . . .  On this occasion too the women come boldly up 
to the men's tree, tease them about their unmanliness and 
demand money from them also." On his wedding eve, the groom 
is surrounded by older women who sing songs; and at the bride's 
residence the trap mentioned above is set again, and the girls 
particularly are involved in the chase of any men, particulaifLy 
youths who come near (Gunnison: 2- :3 1 -2 ).
In terms of analysing this limited data, 1 am struck 
by the presence of two main categories of women - unmarried 
girls, and the matrons. For the unmarried girls, these are 
occasions where they can meet and encourage the courting of 
the young men. For the matrons, their involvement at the 
time of marriage is indicative of the crisis which it forms 
for them; they remind the groom of the responsibility he bears 
in carrying on the name of his ancestors and older kinsmen, 
and with the bride, they have been involved in a long session 
of negotiations about bridewealth, and preparations for the 
wedding itself. For a marriage to take place, it is not the 
consent of the bride, or of her father that is final, it is 
the consent of her mother, backed by her senior female kin.
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Ceremonies associated with circumcision and marriage are 
most important for the Humr women in being a display of 
their corporate involvement according to their marital and 
maternal status. These same ceremonies are for the Shahsavan 
women occasions to invite or be invited to feasts, to define 
or redefine individual dyadic relations, and to assess the 
relative status of the different women.
I can find no evidence in Gunnison of how at 
ceremonies one could observe women who were notable individually, 
and I should not expect to find it. Those women who are 
prominent in Humr camps may have particular influence with 
men, but I find no reason why they should also be leaders among 
women. The two women to whom Gunnison refers with particular 
respect are Ghubeysha and Hamidy,Already referred to earlierA 
They are both prominent, but for different reasons. Ghubeysha 
manages a large and mixed household in the camp of her brother 
Hurgas. "She had the reputation of sound wisdom and great 
strength of character - people said of her that she was not 
like a woman at all because of this; she was a man" (Gunnison: 
1:52). She had come to manage this household through returning 
to her brother's camp after two marriages, and through her own 
personal abilityj for she had been entrusted with the son from 
the marriage of one of her daughters, and had some cattle to 
hold through him. In addition, she had the use of a garden 
from Hurgas, and the cattle of one of the men who had attached
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himself to the household. By contrast, Hamidy in the splinter 
camp had come to her position through a series of factors that 
were not in her individual control but which gave her a strong 
personal position. She was wealthy, through the cattle she 
held for her daughters and their children; and through the 
shortage of cattle elsewhere in the camp, this meant that men 
clustered around her, and that she cane to manage an independent 
household. She was almost independent within this household, 
both through her wealth, and through the continued absences of 
her brother in the town. But in addition, her structural 
position within the splinter camp was such that, if she chose 
to operate it, her influence was extremely great in camp affairs.
Not only was she independent and managing her own 
household, she was the sister of the man who offered Hurgas the 
only challenge to his leadership (i.e. the only challenge within 
the surra that is mentioned by Gunnison). The issue that came 
up was to whom the half-sister of Hurgas should be married. 
Hurgas, because of his position as leader of the camp, and 
omda, wished to marry her to an influential middle-aged man 
of the 'Ariya major lineage, and succeeded in forcing the 
marriage through against the wishes of Hamdan, the brother 
of Hamidy, who then led away the splinter camp. In the 
mobilisation of the two men’s action-sets at the time of the 
dispute and in the ensuing breakaway from the main camp,
Hamidy held a crucial position. For what each man had to 
do was to recruit support from amongst the camp and surra,
and in the transactions involved, it was individual ties with 
the two main participants that were important, not common 
membership of a corporate grouping (Mayer:1968:112-8;. Purely 
corporate values may well have swung the support behind Hamdan, 
for he was suggesting that the girl should marry a youth within 
the surra. HurgaSjby suggesting that she should marry outside, 
was breaking with the customary preference in marriage. But in 
the formations that took place as each man mobilised kin to the- 
support of his point of view, it was individual ties., particularly 
of economic support,that were most relevant.
Cunnison is ambiguous in the reasons that he gives as 
to why the split came about. He says that there was some previous 
indication of strain, and that "those who resided in the splinter 
camp did not have the same kinds of connexions by marriage with 
Hurgas and his extended family" as did the others who moved with 
Hamdan. "For those who had such connexions through extant 
marriages all remained in the main camp" (Cunnison:1 :79)• Thus 
he makes it clear that it is marital ties that most constrained 
people to remain with Hurgas. He leaves the wealth of Hurgas
and the economic dependence on him of the people in the main
camp as a secondary issue. He states almost as an aside
that "no doubt the wealth and prestige of Hurgas as omda added
force to the obligation of his surra in-laws to live with him, 
though sometimes it was a struggle for them to do so". In fact 
these ties of marriage, and the number of people that they had 
drawn to Hurgas were created and maintained because of Hurgas1
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waalth and the relative poverty of his affines. In scale cases, 
especially Abu Dik and his brother, marriage into Hurgas1 
family had been deliberate economic strategy. And Abu Dik was 
forced to maintain a neutral stand within Hurgas' camp, so as 
to maintain his ties. Had there been no other person with any 
amount of wealth, no split could have resulted. But Hamidy was 
wealthy, and it was around the cattle that she held that the 
splinter camp formed. In the dispute ostensibly between Hurgas 
and Hamdan, it is clear that Hamidy held the trump card. Her 
agreement to Hamdan*s action was essential.
If we look again at Tapper's description of those 
women who become leaders among the Shahsavan, then it becomes 
clear that her analysis is not appropriate to the Humr. I 
consider women such as Ghubeysha and Haaidy to be prominent, 
but not leaders. A leader among the Shahsavan women has "a 
powerful position in the women's sub-society and significant 
influence in the male sphere" (Tapper:78)• The powerful position 
in the women's sub-society is measured by her continual invitation 
to feasts, which allows her to communicate with a wide range 
of women, to have high status and to be consulted frequently.
Her "significant influence" is measured by her almost equal 
participation in men's conversation and discussion. But there 
are limitations to acquiring a leadership role. Generally 
only the women who are post-menopause, with a distinctive 
personality and intelligence and with the specialisation of 
being a ceremonial cook, or having been on the pilgrimage,
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qualify as leaders. The specialisation is necessary to give 
the women some form of public role which increases the range 
of their personal networks and consequently the number of 
invitations to feasts * and the possibility of their being 
consulted by men (78-87)*
The "perquisites of leadership", as Tapper calls 
them, the numerous invitations to feasts and the influence over 
men are not individually achieved assets among the Humr women.
I cannot predict the way in which the ceremonial gatherings 
are organised. But, given the corporate life of Humr women in 
the camp, they are likely to be involved in all camp ceremonies, 
and will attend at the circumcisions and weddings of kin in 
other camps^ So that the first perquisite of leadership seems 
appropriate to most women and the second is the corporate asset 
of all Humr women. The Humr women can at any time approach the 
men to discuss important matters, they are aware of most of 
what is being discussed at the tree anyway, and they can on 
occasion jointly confront the men. As Gunnison says,
"a policy decision that the men of a camp or surra make is 
influenced by the kind of reaction that the women of the group 
are likely to have towards it" (Cunnison:1:117)* They can 
approach the men individually, or confront them corporately. 
However in only one instance have X been able to see signs of 
an individual woman mobilising other women around her to pursue 
her own interests. That instance is the occasion of the
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marriage of a daughter, where the mother mobilises the females 
of her family to support her in the demands that she is making 
from the men of both families (see Chapter One, page ),
I was initially tempted to analyse this occasion as an 
instance of the matrons being able to mobilise a purposive action- 
set which might also be turned to other purposes, and might be the 
basis for differentiation in power among women. There were some 
grounds for analysing in these terms 9 for the way in which the 
women were mobilised had features in common with what Mayer 
described for the electoral action-set of the Dewas candidate 
(Mayer: 196 8 ). The women were mobilised by an individual, the 
mother concerned, and had a single purpose in common, to offer 
support to the mother in confronting the men of both families. 
There was therefore a "transactional" content in the linkages 
between the mother and the women, and the other women were aware 
of being recruited for that specific purpose. In addition, it 
could be maintained that the mother had significant gains to 
make if she were successful in exacting high demands from the 
men. This was after all a moment of great crisis to her, and 
a threat to her personal interests to lose her daughter. So she 
could hope to prevent or delay the marriage, or to compensate 
by material gains in the bridewealth paid to her.
However, X found that such analysis could not hold, 
on two main grounds. First 9 the women recruited were not 
just any members of her personal network that she selected^ 
for it is quite clear that Gunnison refers to the women as
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being from "her family" (G u n n i s o n : 28) ♦ Therefore it was 
more an expression of the solidarity of the women of one 
family in opposition to the men, than an indication of a 
matron having the ability to mobilise other women. Secondly, 
it was impossible to demonstrate that the action-set mobilised 
on this occasion could be seen in action on other occasions. 
Even though there is clear differentiation in the power 
potential of the different age categories of the women, it 
was not in such individual terms as this would have suggested. 
There is a general pattern in Humr society of the gradual 
liberation of women from the close bonds prior to marriage 
where they are subject to the authority and control of both 
men (father and brothers) and women (mother and older women), 
to the time when they have successfully passed through 
marriage and maternity to become matrons themselves. Within 
this general pattern it is useful to separate out those 
women who are prominent, not in terms of leadership, but in 
terms of their economic independence, and management of 
separate households. These women, such as Ghubeysha and 
Hamidy, have the potential of great influence- over men’s 
decisions, but they cannot be called leaders among the women.
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Concluslons
Ghubeysha and Hamidy were exceptional among the Humr 
matrons, and few women could aspire to positions of prominence 
such as theirs. For the factors which brought about their 
prominence were largely beyond the control of any individual 
woman, and were related to the fortuitous accumulation of wealth 
and through the course of a complex marital career. The careers 
of women in these two societies, while allowing for change of 
status and development of some control over their own interests, 
are not directed by the women themselves. However,exceptional 
though the two women may be, the means by which they came to 
their independence are indicative of the build-up of power for 
Humr matrons, which makes their position in society so radically 
different from that of the Kababish matron.
With marriage, a Humr girl gains a new status, as the 
focus of links no longer directed through her parents, as the 
dependent of her husband, while yet remaining the focus of the 
corporate interests of her agnatic kin, as demonstrated in the 
visiting and arrangements made about property. The continued 
interests of agnatic kin not only ensure the fulfillment of 
the minimum of her rights, but also give her a position as a 
mediator of links between men. This in turn allows her to 
operate these links and to utilise them to protect her interests 
in property and her children. And, because these links 
between men are of both economic and political significance,
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the range of her influence extends beyond the domestic sphere 
and into the public political sphere.
This extension of the domestic influence of married 
women into the public political sphere is further reinforced 
by the fact that the women of other households with whom she 
cooperates and socialises, are also members of households with 
whom her husband is economically cooperating. The women there­
fore are fully integrated into the corporate life of the camps, 
and because of the public nature of Humr camp life, with many 
activities conducted in the open, women cannot be excluded 
from political influence and public expression of their 
opinions. Among the Humr women as a category, the clearest 
differentiation in status and power is between the unmarried 
girl and the matron. /Although the girl has some public
role to play, as her participation in the circumcision songs 
demonstrates, she remains effectively subject to the authority 
not only of men, as her guardians, but also of her mother.
Until her marriage she has no structural importance, for it 
is that event which defines her status as an adult and individual 
personality, with rights and claims to make in her own interests. 
Once married, she has some freedom of choice, and has found 
the basis for her power. Given that she is successful in bearing 
children and retaining the provision made for them, she can by 
the time of her matronhood have a considerable role to play in 
the processes of domestic and public decision-making, The 
progress from the status of married woman to that of matron is
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uninterrupt ed by the frequency of divorce and remarriage, and 
only in very rare cases is there a threat to a matron*s status 
through polygyny.
Prior to my analysis, the Kababish women would have 
seemed to hold certain advantages, for infrequency of divorce 
and absence of polygyny are held by observers to be factors 
advantageous to women. However, this would overlook the 
conditions within marriage, and the organisation of households 
as domestic units. Household organisation among the commoner 
Kababish is based on autonomous units of nuclear family house­
holds, within camps that are not enduring structural entities. 
Men within a camp have no predictable pattern of economic 
cooperation, but operate as independent heads of households.
This has the effect of isolating women within households, ;
apart from th^' socialising-'hetween women of neighbouring ' ^ 
tents. Married women therefore operate for the most part 
within the domestic sphere only, and are severely curtailed 
in the influence that they can bring to bear on the decisions 
of men. Although it is the matron whose position is that of 
greatest prestige, as the mother of children of marriageable 
age, and with the right to be consulted as to the future of 
such children, she is, when compared with the Humr matrons, 
relatively powerless to avoid the demands of the one man who 
holds authority • over her. gxcept in the case of marriages
of strategic concern, the interests of natal kin in a woman 
lapse over time, and she is isolated with her husband.
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Thesa conclusions were reached through a synthesis 
of career analysis, and analysis of the personal networks of 
married women in these two societies. The career analysis 
allowed for differentiation between women in different stages 
of their marital careers, and avoided any possibility of a 
false sex category being created. The network analysis was 
severely limited by the lack of sufficiently pr'ecisa data, but 
did allow for some exploration of how new relationships with 
both men and women were created and maintained in the course of 
women1s careers. It became clear that the corporate existence 
of the Humr camps with both men and women cooperating in their 
different spheres led to a patterning of individual networks 
that was conducive to women having important influence in domestic 
decisions, and that this was reinforced and extended by the ability 
of women to combine in purposive action. The combination of these 
two methods led to comparison between the different stages of 
women*s careers in one society, and of these stages within the 
two societies. Particularly the focus was turned onto comparison 
between the matrons in the two societies.
The major variable determining the different status 
of the Humr matrons as compared with the Kababish matrons, and 
their relative chances of power, is household organisation, and 
the way that this affects the chances of women having any degree 
of economic autonomy. Households in both societies are 
producing/consuming units, within which the work of women 
contributes to production and is valued as such. But whereas
- 126-
the organisation of households is among the Humr more complex, 
involving extended families and some mUltiple-tent households 
which include women on their own, that of the Kababish is simpler, 
generally based on the nuclear family unit. Between the house­
holds of the Humr camps, a predictable pattern of cooperation 
between both men and women is observed, whereas the emphasis 
in the Kababish households is to avoid outside ties and to 
remain autonomous. The complexity of the Humr households and 
the pattern of cooperation are the economic base for the 
corporate life of the camping units, and it is this corporateness 
that allows the Humr women some economic autonomy in the later 
stages of their marital careers. Dsspite the fact that
those women in richer households can gain a regular small surplus 
to spend as they wish, the deciding factor as to which women 
achieve economic autonomy as matrons is the pattern by which 
maintenance of dependents is arranged. Corporate interests of 
agnatic kin in women and children as dependents is such that, 
in certain circumstances, a woman can continue to receive 
maintenance, while separate residentially from the donors.
Were the rules relating to women!s residence as rigid as they 
are with the Kababish, then no matron could achieve the position 
of Hamidy (see earlier).
However, in another sense, household organisation 
affects the status of married women in these two societies 
by restricting any chance of women having economic autonomy 
until the later stages of their marital career. Whatever the
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surplus that the woman in a rich Humr household can build up 
from housekeeping and gifts, it is never sufficient to maintain 
a household independently. The real boosts to a woman’s own 
property come with the marriage of a daughter and the presentation 
of bridewealth, as applies to both Humr and Kababish mothers; and 
with the Humr mother whose daughters’ cattle are being held in 
trust by her. The only substantial amount of these described 
is the cattle held in trust, and only matrons qualify for this 
position.
This point about the only chance of women having 
economic autonomy late in life is of wider relevance, as 
Chapter Two already indicated^ -for it frequently happens that 
women in different societies have some chance of economic 
autonomy. But it is rare that this coincides with the early 
or middle stages of a marital career, When this coincidence 
does occur, then radical changes in women’s status and roles 
can be predicted; for it amounts to a serious challenge to the 
dichotomy in sex roles, based on the economic and social dominance 
of men (see Nadel:Nupe:174). Such challenge totraditional division 
in sex roles does not occur whenever women have economic autonomy, 
only when this coincides with the early and middle stages of 
married life.
Career analysis allows for comparison of the patterns 
of women’s careers in different societies and within different 
strata of the same society. It prepares the way for estimating 
the developments that have taken place in economic opportunities
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for women, and for assessing the changes that result in the 
total role inventory- of women. However, it cannot predict these 
changes, it can only identify those stages in women’s careers 
that are most affected by changes in work opportunities. For 
example, it is impossible to predict the changes that will result 
from the way some Humr women are now leaving for work in the 
towns, or are able to grow their own cash crop of cotton 
(Gunnison:1:63). To assess the effects of such developments on 
women’s roles, it is necessary first to know when the women are 
carrying out such activity, before marriage, during marriage, or 
as the result of separation from husband, and then secondly to 
relate these developments to other changes that are taking place, 
such as the pattern of young men leaving for wage-labour, and 
returning with the herd that they have built up (Chapter One: Page 9)* 
The method of career analysis has been used by observers 
to identify the different phases of women’s life-spans in western 
industrial society, and to assess the developments that have taken 
place within these phases. The major development has been the 
greatly increased expectation of life, and the reduction of the 
period entirely devoted to maternal duties, as the size and 
structure of the family has changed (Myrdal:1968:13 and 25).
In addition, a general pattern has emerged of women having a 
pre-marital economic career of paid employment in productive 
work. This period usually lasts for five years to seven years 
(Myrdal and Klein:1956:31). And now there is observable a
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trend for women to return to paid employment outside the home 
after the childbearing years. But, observers agree, the 
crucial development will come in relation to those women who 
are married and engaged in childrearing. As Myrdal states,
the most radical development in womenfs participation in 
economic and political life will be “the endeavour of a growing 
number of women to combine family and employment11 for, prior to 
this time, the condition for women being admitted to an increasing 
number of hitherto “masculine11 careers has been “that the women 
are unencumbered by family ties” (Myrdal: 1968:1).
So far, what has happened is that despite the shortening 
of the maternal phase in women's life-spans, their familial roles 
have continued to dominate their adult life and economic activity. 
I cannot agree with Myrdal and Klein's assessment “that women 
should enter the world of employment is today taken for granted, 
as a rule, and their right to do most jobs is hardly queried" 
(1 9 5 6 :2 9 -3 2 ), for their own analysis shows how the pattern of 
women's work is affected by the marital and maternal phase.
The evidence of Juliet Mitchell is that not only is the time 
spent by women in outside employment affected, but also the 
nature of such work. She made an enquiry into the facts of 
the distribution and pay of women in various employments and 
came to the conclusion that the kinds of employment that women 
undertake are for the most part “extensions of their expressive 
familial roles" for “at present women perform unskilled
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uncreative service jobs" for which they receive far less money 
than do the men for the manual work that they perform (Mitchell: 
1971:149).
The basis to the difference in the interpretations of 
Myrdal and Klein, and of Mitchell, is that the former are content 
to indicate the changes that have taken place in the life-spans 
of women, and to relate these phases to the structure and size of 
families, without, as Mitchell does, analysing the position of 
married women within the family, and how it is the woman’s role 
within the family that continues to dominate her adult life, and 
her economic and political potential. As long as the "familial 
stage" of women’s lives remains intact as the phase where women 
are private, domestic creatures, who are dependent on their 
husbands for maintenance, then marital and maternal roles 
continue to dominate women’s adult lives. The assumption is 
that women will retire at some stage into domestic existence 
where "their primary identification is as maintained persons 
within the family" (Mitchell:180). The position of women in 
the family has remained intact, despite the radical changes 
that have taken place in the social function and importance of 
the family as a social unit, and in the organisation of house­
holds, of which it forms the base. "Today women are confined 
within the family which is a segmentary, monolithic unit, 
largely separated from production and hence from social human 
activity" (Mitchell:151). Households are no longer
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production/ consumption units within which the labour of women 
is valued, but are mainly consumption units producing labour 
for paid work outside. As long as the adult woman's life 
continues to be dominated by her familial roles, her social 
position will be determined by the nature of the family as a 
social unit*
Within the urban industrial family, there is no 
opportunity for any build-up of economic autonomy by married 
women, and there is no clear distinction between the different 
phases in a married woman’s career, unless marked by a return 
to outside employment. The basic dichotomy in iflale/female 
roles has remained intact, with men the economic providers, 
and socially dominant, while women are typically private, 
domestic creatures, with little economic potential and little 
or no participation in public, social life. Marriage is 
increasingly popular, so that the challenge that could have 
been provided to this male-female dichotomy by career women 
who remained single has been dissipated; and within marriage 
women do not mature, like the Humr and Kababish women, to 
public status or prestige or to participation in public social 
life. The careers of women in our society remain dominated by 
marriage and familial roles, despite the pattern of their 
careers differing from those of the Humr and the Kababish, 
Women in our society do have pre-marital and post-farailial 
career opportunities, however limited they may be; but the 
effect of such opportunities is diminished by the continued
dominance of the marital/maternal phase in their lives. In 
this phase, women remain the economic dependents and the social 
subordinates of men.
However, the whole basis to the argument in this 
thesis has been the attempt to get away from sex categorisation, 
and to develop a more dynamic approach to the way in which 
women operate within their disadvantages. I have clarified 
the ways in which it would be mistaken to regard the Humr and 
ICababish women as undifferentiated, and powerless^ ^or all 
women, once married, develop some sphere of influence over the 
decision that men take, and can in the long run protect their 
interests to an extent. The Humr women are more successful 
because of the diversity of claims that they have over men, 
and because of the public role that they have corporately in 
camp life. And it remains now to relate this finding to the 
experience of the married women in their isolated urban ■ 
households.
It is exactly this area of study in which there has 
been the greatest concentration of the use of network analysis. 
In fact, the impetus provided by Elizabeth Bott's study has 
been such as to "have had the effect of associating the notion 
of social network almost exclusively with conjugal roles"
(Mitehell:1969:6). While this is, as Mitchell says, unfortunate, 
for it has led to overlooking of fields in which the relevance
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of this method would perhaps be more obvious, there are good 
reasons why this emphasis has developed, quite apart from the 
initial impetus of Bott's study. There has been a tradition 
in social anthropology and sociology to place great weight on 
the study of family and kinship systems, and the way in which 
people's behaviour is determined by the social pressures operating 
to demand conformity to normative rules. Particularly in more 
recent urban studies, there has been developing a further 
interest in familial roles, as expected and enacted. The use 
of network analysis is particularly appropriate to such study, 
by allowing for comparison of the patterning of social relation­
ships in different spheres of a parson's life, and relating, 
for example, family and kin, to friends and workmates. Now, 
with Kapferer's adaptation of Bott's technique (see Chapter 
Three), it is possible to compare the personal networks of 
husband and wife, and to relate the interlinkings between the 
two to their role relationship.
As I maintain that women's adult careers are still 
so effectively dominated by their expected familial roles, and 
the normative pressure on their conformity to such roles likewise 
appears great, the relevance of such an approach to my own 
interests is clear. One of the most fruitful areas of study 
still to be approached is to investigate the conditions under 
which rapid development and change in the role definition of 
married women takes place. Some indications have emerged such
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as the trend, to matrifocality in West Indian families (see 
Raymond Smith: 1965) while men are absent on wage-labour in 
the early and middle stages of a marriage; and in the observed 
rise in neurosis among Zulu women who, left by their husbands 
absent on wage-labour, are forced to act independently, and to 
adopt new responsibilities and authority to which they have not 
been trained (jaspan:1953)* Both the conditions inducing such 
change in women's roles and the effects of such change must be 
investigated.
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